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Collusion, Exclusion, and Inclusion in Random-Order Bargaining

Collusion, Exclusion, and Inclusion in Random-Order Bargaining This paper examines the profitability of three types of integration in a cooperative game solved by a random-order value (e.g. the Shapley value). Collusion between players i and j is a contract merging their resources in the hands of one of them, say i. This contract can be represented as a combination of exclusion, which lets i exclude j's resource but not use it himself, and inclusion, which lets i use j's resource but not exclude j from it. This representation yields a third-difference condition on the characteristic function that determines the profitability of collusion, generalizing existing results for specific games. Namely, collusion is profitable [unprofitable] when the complementarity of the colluding players is reduced [increased] by other players. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Review of Economic Studies Oxford University Press

Collusion, Exclusion, and Inclusion in Random-Order Bargaining

The Review of Economic Studies , Volume 70 (2) – Apr 1, 2003

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References (40)

Publisher
Oxford University Press
Copyright
© Published by Oxford University Press.
Subject
Articles
ISSN
0034-6527
eISSN
1467-937X
DOI
10.1111/1467-937X.00251
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

This paper examines the profitability of three types of integration in a cooperative game solved by a random-order value (e.g. the Shapley value). Collusion between players i and j is a contract merging their resources in the hands of one of them, say i. This contract can be represented as a combination of exclusion, which lets i exclude j's resource but not use it himself, and inclusion, which lets i use j's resource but not exclude j from it. This representation yields a third-difference condition on the characteristic function that determines the profitability of collusion, generalizing existing results for specific games. Namely, collusion is profitable [unprofitable] when the complementarity of the colluding players is reduced [increased] by other players.

Journal

The Review of Economic StudiesOxford University Press

Published: Apr 1, 2003

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