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Dynamic Mirrlees Taxation under Political Economy Constraints

Dynamic Mirrlees Taxation under Political Economy Constraints We study the structure of non-linear taxes in a dynamic economy subject to political economy problems. In contrast to existing literature, taxes are set by a self-interested politician, without any commitment power, who is partly controlled by the citizens. We prove that: (1) a version of the revelation principle applies; and (2) the provision of incentives to politicians can be separated from the provision of incentives to individuals. Using these results, we provide conditions under which distortions created by political economy problems persist or disappear. We then extend these results to environments with partially benevolent governments and potential ex post conflict among the citizens. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Review of Economic Studies Oxford University Press

Dynamic Mirrlees Taxation under Political Economy Constraints

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References (1)

Publisher
Oxford University Press
Copyright
© Published by Oxford University Press.
Subject
Original Articles
ISSN
0034-6527
eISSN
1467-937X
DOI
10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00587.x
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

We study the structure of non-linear taxes in a dynamic economy subject to political economy problems. In contrast to existing literature, taxes are set by a self-interested politician, without any commitment power, who is partly controlled by the citizens. We prove that: (1) a version of the revelation principle applies; and (2) the provision of incentives to politicians can be separated from the provision of incentives to individuals. Using these results, we provide conditions under which distortions created by political economy problems persist or disappear. We then extend these results to environments with partially benevolent governments and potential ex post conflict among the citizens.

Journal

The Review of Economic StudiesOxford University Press

Published: Jul 1, 2010

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