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Health, Disease and Naturalism: Hausman on the Public Value of Health

Health, Disease and Naturalism: Hausman on the Public Value of Health AbstractWhether health and disease are value-free concepts is a matter of long-standing debate. This question is relevant to public health ethics because the distinction between health and disease is frequently employed to delineate the public interest or justify state involvement. This article evaluates a recent attempt by Hausman to both defend a naturalistic (or non-evaluative) account of health and disease, and provide an account of the public value of health. I argue that Hausman’s naturalistic account of health cannot be maintained. As well as undermining the naturalist project more generally, this has two specific implications. First, it undermines Hausman’s claim that functional efficiencies—unlike health states—can be ranked in a value-free manner. Secondly, it affects Hausman’s account of the public value of health. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Public Health Ethics Oxford University Press

Health, Disease and Naturalism: Hausman on the Public Value of Health

Kingma, Elselijn
Public Health Ethics , Volume 10 (2) – Jul 1, 2017
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References (49)

Publisher
Oxford University Press
Copyright
© The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press. Available online at www.phe.oxfordjournals.org
ISSN
1754-9973
eISSN
1754-9981
DOI
10.1093/phe/phx001
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

AbstractWhether health and disease are value-free concepts is a matter of long-standing debate. This question is relevant to public health ethics because the distinction between health and disease is frequently employed to delineate the public interest or justify state involvement. This article evaluates a recent attempt by Hausman to both defend a naturalistic (or non-evaluative) account of health and disease, and provide an account of the public value of health. I argue that Hausman’s naturalistic account of health cannot be maintained. As well as undermining the naturalist project more generally, this has two specific implications. First, it undermines Hausman’s claim that functional efficiencies—unlike health states—can be ranked in a value-free manner. Secondly, it affects Hausman’s account of the public value of health.

Journal

Public Health Ethics – Oxford University Press

Published: Jul 1, 2017

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