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/lp/oxford-university-press/incentives-and-the-rule-of-law-an-intervention-in-the-kramer-simmonds-l5A9QIOacj
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Copyright
- © 2006 by The University of Notre Dame
- ISSN
- 0065-8995
- eISSN
- 2049-6494
- DOI
- 10.1093/ajj/51.1.149
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
INCENTIVES AND THE RULE OF LAW: AN INTERVENTION IN THE KRAMER/SIMMONDS DEBATE HAMISH STEWART* I. INTRODUCTION Is the rule of law morally neutral, in the modest sense that a wicked legal regime will have good prudential reasons to comply with the requirements of the rule of law? In a recent series of exchanges, Matthew Kramer and Nigel Simmonds have hotly debated this question. Among other arguments in support of the moral neutrality of the rule of law, Kramer has claimed that departures from the rule of law in general tend to weaken incentives for compliance with the law, even if that law is wicked; consequently, even a wicked legal regime has good prudential reasons for complying with the rule of law, and to that extent at least, the rule of law is morally neutral. Simmonds argues that departures from the rule of law in general do not tend to weaken the citizen's incentive to comply with a wicked legal regime's objectives, so the regime has no particular reason to comply with the rule of law; consequently, incentives for compliance have no particular bearing on the moral status of the rule of law. Kramer and Simmonds both recognize that although
Journal
American Journal of Jurisprudence – Oxford University Press
Published: Jan 1, 2006