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Measurement in Medicine: A Practical Guide
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Copyright
- © The Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press. Available online at www.phe.oxfordjournals.org
- ISSN
- 1754-9973
- eISSN
- 1754-9981
- DOI
- 10.1093/phe/phw015
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
AbstractIn Valuing Health, Dan Hausman argues that well-being is not measurable, at least not in the way that science and policy would require. His argument depends on a demanding conception of well-being and on a pessimistic verdict upon the existing measures of subjective well-being. Neither of these reasons, I argue, warrant as much skepticism as Hausman professes.
Journal
Public Health Ethics – Oxford University Press
Published: Jul 1, 2017