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Marriage and Class*

Marriage and Class* Here we consider a matching model where agents are heterogeneous and utilities nontransferable. We utilize this framework to study how equilibrium sorting takes place in marriage markets. We impose conditions that guarantee the existence of a steady state equihbrium and then characterize it. Several examples are developed to illustrate the richness of equilibria. The model reveals an interesting sorting externality that can support multiple steady state equilibria, even with constant returns to matching. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Quarterly Journal of Economics Oxford University Press

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References (12)

Publisher
Oxford University Press
Copyright
© Published by Oxford University Press.
Subject
Articles
ISSN
0033-5533
eISSN
1531-4650
DOI
10.1162/003355397555154
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Here we consider a matching model where agents are heterogeneous and utilities nontransferable. We utilize this framework to study how equilibrium sorting takes place in marriage markets. We impose conditions that guarantee the existence of a steady state equihbrium and then characterize it. Several examples are developed to illustrate the richness of equilibria. The model reveals an interesting sorting externality that can support multiple steady state equilibria, even with constant returns to matching.

Journal

The Quarterly Journal of EconomicsOxford University Press

Published: Feb 1, 1997

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