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Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Experimental Evidence

Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Experimental Evidence Article PDF first page preview Close This content is only available as a PDF. Author notes We are grateful to Robyn Dawes, Paul Milgrom, John Carter, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments, and to Dan Schneidewend and Soren Hauge for expert programming and research assistance. Andreoni also thanks the National Science Foundation, grant SES 8821204, for financial support. Errors are the responsibility of the authors. © Royal Economic Society 1993 http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Economic Journal Oxford University Press

Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Experimental Evidence

Economic Journal , Volume 103 (418) – May 1, 1993

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References (20)

Publisher
Oxford University Press
Copyright
© Royal Economic Society 1993
ISSN
0013-0133
eISSN
1468-0297
DOI
10.2307/2234532
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Article PDF first page preview Close This content is only available as a PDF. Author notes We are grateful to Robyn Dawes, Paul Milgrom, John Carter, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments, and to Dan Schneidewend and Soren Hauge for expert programming and research assistance. Andreoni also thanks the National Science Foundation, grant SES 8821204, for financial support. Errors are the responsibility of the authors. © Royal Economic Society 1993

Journal

Economic JournalOxford University Press

Published: May 1, 1993

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