Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Subscribe now for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

Strategic Jump Bidding in English Auctions

Strategic Jump Bidding in English Auctions This paper solves for equilibria of sequential bid (or English) auctions with affiliated values when jump bidding strategies may be employed to intimidate one's opponents. In these equilibria, jump bids serve as correlating devices which select asymmetric bidding functions to be played subsequently. Each possibility of jump bidding provides a Pareto improvement for the bidders from the symmetric equilibrium of a sealed bid, second-price auction. The expanded set of equilibria can approximate either first- or second-price outcomes and produce exactly the set of expected prices between those two bounds. These results contrast with standard conclusions that equate English and second-price auctions. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Review of Economic Studies Oxford University Press

Strategic Jump Bidding in English Auctions

The Review of Economic Studies , Volume 65 (2) – Apr 1, 1998

Loading next page...
 
/lp/oxford-university-press/strategic-jump-bidding-in-english-auctions-tvSeJrPSc3

References (32)

Publisher
Oxford University Press
Copyright
© Published by Oxford University Press.
Subject
Articles
ISSN
0034-6527
eISSN
1467-937X
DOI
10.1111/1467-937X.00041
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

This paper solves for equilibria of sequential bid (or English) auctions with affiliated values when jump bidding strategies may be employed to intimidate one's opponents. In these equilibria, jump bids serve as correlating devices which select asymmetric bidding functions to be played subsequently. Each possibility of jump bidding provides a Pareto improvement for the bidders from the symmetric equilibrium of a sealed bid, second-price auction. The expanded set of equilibria can approximate either first- or second-price outcomes and produce exactly the set of expected prices between those two bounds. These results contrast with standard conclusions that equate English and second-price auctions.

Journal

The Review of Economic StudiesOxford University Press

Published: Apr 1, 1998

There are no references for this article.