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The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures

The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures Many incentives in organizations arise not through explicit formal incentive contracts but rather implicitly through career concerns. This paper models career concerns through agents trying to manipulate the market assessment of their future productivity. The information flow from current actions to market assessment is therefore crucial in determining the nature of these incentives. Improved information may either increase or reduce incentives. The impact of information provides a major distinction between the explicit and implicit incentives model. The paper derives general results on comparisons of information structures which serve as counterparts to the standard results on information structures in the principal-agent model: sufficient statistic, impact of a Blackwell garbling, comparison of inclusive information structures. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Review of Economic Studies Oxford University Press

The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures

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References (18)

Publisher
Oxford University Press
Copyright
© Published by Oxford University Press.
Subject
Special Issue: Contracts
ISSN
0034-6527
eISSN
1467-937X
DOI
10.1111/1467-937X.00084
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Many incentives in organizations arise not through explicit formal incentive contracts but rather implicitly through career concerns. This paper models career concerns through agents trying to manipulate the market assessment of their future productivity. The information flow from current actions to market assessment is therefore crucial in determining the nature of these incentives. Improved information may either increase or reduce incentives. The impact of information provides a major distinction between the explicit and implicit incentives model. The paper derives general results on comparisons of information structures which serve as counterparts to the standard results on information structures in the principal-agent model: sufficient statistic, impact of a Blackwell garbling, comparison of inclusive information structures.

Journal

The Review of Economic StudiesOxford University Press

Published: Jan 1, 1999

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