Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Subscribe now for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

The Existence of Self-Enforcing Implicit Contracts

The Existence of Self-Enforcing Implicit Contracts Abstract Implicit contracts are nontrivial Nash equilibria to the post-hiring trading game between a worker and the employer. These are supported by intrafirm, rather than labor market, reputations. The existence of an implicit contract that supports efficient trade is proved in a simple model. * I wish to thank Jess Benhabib, Benjamin Eden, Boyan Jovanovic, John Kennan, Lewis Kornhauser, Edward Lazear, Kevin Murphy, Roy Radner, Bruno Stein, Robert Topel, Charles Wilson, and an anonymous referee for their comments. As if that were not enough, I owe a special debt of thanks to Roman Frydman, Carolyn Pitchik, Peter Rappoport, and Andrew Schotter. All errors in the paper are mine alone. The research in this paper was financed by grants from the C. V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University and the National Science Foundation (SES 8409276). This content is only available as a PDF. © 1987 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Quarterly Journal of Economics Oxford University Press

The Existence of Self-Enforcing Implicit Contracts

The Quarterly Journal of Economics , Volume 102 (1) – Feb 1, 1987

Loading next page...
 
/lp/oxford-university-press/the-existence-of-self-enforcing-implicit-contracts-XuDYJmFmMf

References (13)

Publisher
Oxford University Press
Copyright
© 1987 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
ISSN
0033-5533
eISSN
1531-4650
DOI
10.2307/1884685
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Abstract Implicit contracts are nontrivial Nash equilibria to the post-hiring trading game between a worker and the employer. These are supported by intrafirm, rather than labor market, reputations. The existence of an implicit contract that supports efficient trade is proved in a simple model. * I wish to thank Jess Benhabib, Benjamin Eden, Boyan Jovanovic, John Kennan, Lewis Kornhauser, Edward Lazear, Kevin Murphy, Roy Radner, Bruno Stein, Robert Topel, Charles Wilson, and an anonymous referee for their comments. As if that were not enough, I owe a special debt of thanks to Roman Frydman, Carolyn Pitchik, Peter Rappoport, and Andrew Schotter. All errors in the paper are mine alone. The research in this paper was financed by grants from the C. V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University and the National Science Foundation (SES 8409276). This content is only available as a PDF. © 1987 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Journal

The Quarterly Journal of EconomicsOxford University Press

Published: Feb 1, 1987

There are no references for this article.