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Toward a Consistent Natural-Law Ethics of False Assertion

Toward a Consistent Natural-Law Ethics of False Assertion TOWARD A CONSISTENT NATURAL-LAW ETHICS OF FALSE ASSERTION GARY CHARTER* I. INTRODUCTION The new classical natural-law theorists (NCNLTs)—including Germain Grisez, John Finnis, Joseph Boyle, Robert P. George, and others—have argued that lying is wrong in principle. I maintain that some instances of false assertion which they might not regard as morally appropriate could be acceptable within the terms of their moral theory. Norms requiring fairness and precluding acting out of hostility should provide appropriate and adequate grounding for limits on false assertion without an absolute prohibition. For the NCNLTs, morally appropriate actions are marked by genuine regard for human fulfillment—the fulfillment of actors and of those affected by their actions. A good life is a life lived in accordance with practical reason and marked by openness to the basic human goods. These goods include self- integration, practical reasonableness and authenticity, friendship, play and skillful performance, religion, life and bodily well being, knowledge, and aesthetic experience. Each is equally basic: all of the others can be understood with reference to each good, but none can be reduced to any of the others or to something else, like "pleasure" or "happiness." On this—plausible—view, morality is a second-order affair, governing human beings' http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png American Journal of Jurisprudence Oxford University Press

Toward a Consistent Natural-Law Ethics of False Assertion

Chartier, Gary
American Journal of Jurisprudence , Volume 51 (1) – Jan 1, 2006
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Publisher
Oxford University Press
Copyright
© 2006 by The University of Notre Dame
ISSN
0065-8995
eISSN
2049-6494
DOI
10.1093/ajj/51.1.43
Publisher site
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Abstract

TOWARD A CONSISTENT NATURAL-LAW ETHICS OF FALSE ASSERTION GARY CHARTER* I. INTRODUCTION The new classical natural-law theorists (NCNLTs)—including Germain Grisez, John Finnis, Joseph Boyle, Robert P. George, and others—have argued that lying is wrong in principle. I maintain that some instances of false assertion which they might not regard as morally appropriate could be acceptable within the terms of their moral theory. Norms requiring fairness and precluding acting out of hostility should provide appropriate and adequate grounding for limits on false assertion without an absolute prohibition. For the NCNLTs, morally appropriate actions are marked by genuine regard for human fulfillment—the fulfillment of actors and of those affected by their actions. A good life is a life lived in accordance with practical reason and marked by openness to the basic human goods. These goods include self- integration, practical reasonableness and authenticity, friendship, play and skillful performance, religion, life and bodily well being, knowledge, and aesthetic experience. Each is equally basic: all of the others can be understood with reference to each good, but none can be reduced to any of the others or to something else, like "pleasure" or "happiness." On this—plausible—view, morality is a second-order affair, governing human beings'

Journal

American Journal of Jurisprudence – Oxford University Press

Published: Jan 1, 2006

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