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- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Copyright
- © The Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press. Available online at www.phe.oxfordjournals.org
- ISSN
- 1754-9973
- eISSN
- 1754-9981
- DOI
- 10.1093/phe/phw006
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
AbstractWhen one faces competing claims of varying strength on public resources for health, which claims count? This article proposes the following answer. One should count, or aggregate, a person’s claim just in case one could sympathize with her desire to prioritize her own claim over the strongest competing claim. It argues that this principle yields appealing case judgments and has a plausible grounding in both sympathetic identification with each person, taken separately, and respect for the person for whom most is at stake. It also defends this principle against several heretofore unanswered objections, including those raised by Daniel Hausman in Valuing Health.
Journal
Public Health Ethics – Oxford University Press
Published: Jul 1, 2017