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Electoral Competition When Some Candidates Lie and Others Pander

Electoral Competition When Some Candidates Lie and Others Pander In this paper we analyze a two-candidate electoral competition in which a candidate can either lie about his private policy preference in order to get elected, or pander to post-election external influences in choosing a policy to implement. Both the pre-election announcement and post-election implementation are a candidate’s strategic choices. We show that, in equilibrium, different types of candidates can cluster at different points around the median voter position, as long as the pandering type and the lying type coexist in the candidate pool. The pooling of all types of candidates at the median voter position is also an equilibrium. Thus, despite pressure towards the median (as all candidates want to win the election), both convergence and divergence in candidate announcements are normal outcomes of electoral competition. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Journal of Theoretical Politics SAGE

Electoral Competition When Some Candidates Lie and Others Pander

Journal of Theoretical Politics , Volume 22 (3): 26 – Jul 1, 2010

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References (29)

Publisher
SAGE
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2010.
ISSN
0951-6298
eISSN
1460-3667
DOI
10.1177/0951629810365151
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

In this paper we analyze a two-candidate electoral competition in which a candidate can either lie about his private policy preference in order to get elected, or pander to post-election external influences in choosing a policy to implement. Both the pre-election announcement and post-election implementation are a candidate’s strategic choices. We show that, in equilibrium, different types of candidates can cluster at different points around the median voter position, as long as the pandering type and the lying type coexist in the candidate pool. The pooling of all types of candidates at the median voter position is also an equilibrium. Thus, despite pressure towards the median (as all candidates want to win the election), both convergence and divergence in candidate announcements are normal outcomes of electoral competition.

Journal

Journal of Theoretical PoliticsSAGE

Published: Jul 1, 2010

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