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A discussion of public identification of US audit engagement partners: Who benefits? Who pays?

A discussion of public identification of US audit engagement partners: Who benefits? Who pays? The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board has issued a Concept Release, which would require audit engagement partners of US publicly traded companies to be identified by signing their firm's audit reports. In this article, we attempt to identify who would benefit from – and who would pay for – identification of audit engagement partners. We do this by summarizing the commentary of responders on the Concept Release, comparing the Concept Release to provisions contained in the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, examining arguments for and against identifying the audit engagement partner, and summarizing the likely impact of adopting the Concept Release. We conclude that, if adopted, it is unlikely that audit partner identification would enhance audit quality. Further, the cost of additional audit and/or quality control procedures associated with implementation will likely be borne by companies and their shareholders. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png International Journal of Disclosure and Governance Springer Journals

A discussion of public identification of US audit engagement partners: Who benefits? Who pays?

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References (12)

Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2010 by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Ltd
Subject
Business and Management; Business and Management, general; Accounting/Auditing; Corporate Finance; Corporate Governance
ISSN
1741-3591
eISSN
1746-6539
DOI
10.1057/jdg.2010.13
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board has issued a Concept Release, which would require audit engagement partners of US publicly traded companies to be identified by signing their firm's audit reports. In this article, we attempt to identify who would benefit from – and who would pay for – identification of audit engagement partners. We do this by summarizing the commentary of responders on the Concept Release, comparing the Concept Release to provisions contained in the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, examining arguments for and against identifying the audit engagement partner, and summarizing the likely impact of adopting the Concept Release. We conclude that, if adopted, it is unlikely that audit partner identification would enhance audit quality. Further, the cost of additional audit and/or quality control procedures associated with implementation will likely be borne by companies and their shareholders.

Journal

International Journal of Disclosure and Governance – Springer Journals

Published: Aug 26, 2010

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