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A generalization of the CIS value for cooperative cost games

A generalization of the CIS value for cooperative cost games In this paper, we enrich the model of cooperative cost games by introducing the notion of selfishness levels for players. With this notion, we introduce a new value called the generalized CIS value. To reveal the fairness of the generalized CIS value, we characterize this value through three perspectives. The first one is to provide a procedural implementation for this value, and show that the outcome of this implementation process coincides with the generalized CIS value. Secondly, by applying the optimization theory, we show that the generalized CIS value may minimize the players’ complaints from the perspective of average complaint. Lastly, we approach the generalized CIS value axiomatically by using the efficiency property and the equal maximal complaint property. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png 4OR Springer Journals

A generalization of the CIS value for cooperative cost games

Hou, Dongshuang; Han, Weibin; Xu, Genjiu; Feng, Yifan
4OR , Volume OnlineFirst – Mar 4, 2023
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Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2023. Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.
ISSN
1619-4500
eISSN
1614-2411
DOI
10.1007/s10288-023-00538-4
Publisher site
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Abstract

In this paper, we enrich the model of cooperative cost games by introducing the notion of selfishness levels for players. With this notion, we introduce a new value called the generalized CIS value. To reveal the fairness of the generalized CIS value, we characterize this value through three perspectives. The first one is to provide a procedural implementation for this value, and show that the outcome of this implementation process coincides with the generalized CIS value. Secondly, by applying the optimization theory, we show that the generalized CIS value may minimize the players’ complaints from the perspective of average complaint. Lastly, we approach the generalized CIS value axiomatically by using the efficiency property and the equal maximal complaint property.

Journal

4OR – Springer Journals

Published: Mar 4, 2023

Keywords: Cooperative cost game; Generalized CIS value; Selfishness level; Optimization; Axiomatization; 91A12

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