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A Science-Based Critique of Epistemological Naturalism in Quine’s TraditionScientifically Defending Realism I: Psillos’ Holistic Approach

A Science-Based Critique of Epistemological Naturalism in Quine’s Tradition: Scientifically... [In this chapter, I critically assess the two so-called no-miracle arguments which Psillos proposes in support of scientific realism (I call them NMA and Meta-NMA). After pointing out that leveling the charge of vicious circularity against any of the two arguments comes at an unaffordably high price, I urge that the conclusion of Meta-NMA is false. Concerning NMA, I detail that it faces a formidable objection, the so-called pessimistic meta-induction, and I discuss Psillos’ response to this objection. Finally, I show that the conclusion of the second IBE of NMA—scientific realism with regard to a given scientific theory—falls clearly short of the standards for scientific theories that Psillos himself erects in the course of his response to the pessimistic meta-induction. I argue that this is a general problem of such holistic approaches, and I further corroborate this result by applying it on the arguments for scientific realism developed by Howard Sankey.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

A Science-Based Critique of Epistemological Naturalism in Quine’s TraditionScientifically Defending Realism I: Psillos’ Holistic Approach

Gubelmann, Reto
Springer Journals — Jul 28, 2019
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Publisher
Springer International Publishing
Copyright
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019
ISBN
978-3-030-24523-8
Pages
205 –235
DOI
10.1007/978-3-030-24524-5_8
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[In this chapter, I critically assess the two so-called no-miracle arguments which Psillos proposes in support of scientific realism (I call them NMA and Meta-NMA). After pointing out that leveling the charge of vicious circularity against any of the two arguments comes at an unaffordably high price, I urge that the conclusion of Meta-NMA is false. Concerning NMA, I detail that it faces a formidable objection, the so-called pessimistic meta-induction, and I discuss Psillos’ response to this objection. Finally, I show that the conclusion of the second IBE of NMA—scientific realism with regard to a given scientific theory—falls clearly short of the standards for scientific theories that Psillos himself erects in the course of his response to the pessimistic meta-induction. I argue that this is a general problem of such holistic approaches, and I further corroborate this result by applying it on the arguments for scientific realism developed by Howard Sankey.]

Published: Jul 28, 2019

Keywords: No-miracle arguments; Psillos; Meta-NMA; Scientific realism; Sankey; Naturalism

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