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A Theory of FreedomThe Feminist Standoff: Reviving Consent for Individual Freedom

A Theory of Freedom: The Feminist Standoff: Reviving Consent for Individual Freedom [Consent is central to traditional contract theories of freedom. On these accounts, consent grounds political obligation and political authority insofar as it creates or confers legitimacy onto the state or political institutions (Beran 1977; Simmons 1976).1 But the importance of consent to social freedom transcends legitimizing authority forces. Consent in the social sphere legitimizes the content of individuals’ lives and relations: work, friendship, love, sex, family, and community. Social relations, both personal and institutional, rely on individual consent to establish a link to whom and what one is connected. This makes consent necessary for one to function as a fully choosing subject in her relations. Supposing that conditions for social freedom obtain, consent signifies the absence of domination in relations. On this account, granting social consent to relation content serves to eliminate authority rather than legitimize it.2] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

A Theory of FreedomThe Feminist Standoff: Reviving Consent for Individual Freedom

Part of the Breaking Feminist Waves Book Series
Welch, Shay
A Theory of Freedom — Nov 9, 2015
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Publisher
Palgrave Macmillan US
Copyright
© Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Nature America Inc. 2012
ISBN
978-1-349-44203-4
Pages
83 –110
DOI
10.1057/9781137295026_6
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[Consent is central to traditional contract theories of freedom. On these accounts, consent grounds political obligation and political authority insofar as it creates or confers legitimacy onto the state or political institutions (Beran 1977; Simmons 1976).1 But the importance of consent to social freedom transcends legitimizing authority forces. Consent in the social sphere legitimizes the content of individuals’ lives and relations: work, friendship, love, sex, family, and community. Social relations, both personal and institutional, rely on individual consent to establish a link to whom and what one is connected. This makes consent necessary for one to function as a fully choosing subject in her relations. Supposing that conditions for social freedom obtain, consent signifies the absence of domination in relations. On this account, granting social consent to relation content serves to eliminate authority rather than legitimize it.2]

Published: Nov 9, 2015

Keywords: Social Relation; Social Power; Contract Theory; Social Reciprocity; Disciplinary Power

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