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Pseudo-Generic Products and Barriers to Entry in Pharmaceutical MarketsReview of Industrial Organization, 25
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In pharmaceuticals markets, sellers of branded drugs sometimes sell generic versions of their own branded products, either directly or through license agreements. Although claims that these pseudo-generics may have anti-competitive effects are not unusual, the theoretical literature on this issue is limited and not conclusive. This paper uses a model that combines horizontal and vertical product differentiation, to explain how those effects may occur. We show that the producer of the branded product will not sell the pseudo-generic unless faced with competition and that, if she does so, in some circumstances, all prices rise to the benefit of all sellers and the detriment of consumers.
"Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade" – Springer Journals
Published: Feb 15, 2013
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