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Aristotle on Emotions in Law and PoliticsDispassionate Judges Encountering Hotheaded Aristotelians

Aristotle on Emotions in Law and Politics: Dispassionate Judges Encountering Hotheaded Aristotelians [It has traditionally been assumed that a judge should pass judgement in a rather dispassionate state of mind. More recently, this traditional assumption has been challenged by authors who claim that emotions such as compassion, indignation or anger are not only indispensable, but can even play a beneficial and important role in judicial decision-making. Thus the old ideal of the impassionate judge is challenged by the new ideal of the rightly compassionate, rightly indignant or even rightly angry judge. Some supporters of this new ideal of an emotionally engaged judge invoke Aristotle for the idea that a judge should feel the right emotions in the right way. This paper argues that although there are passages in Aristotle that might be understood as implying such views, Aristotle’s account of the right emotions of a virtuous person does not lend support to an ideal of passionate judges. On the contrary, the author points to contexts in which Aristotle seems to be rather concerned about the possibility of judges who pass their judgement in an emotional state. It is entirely justified to regard Aristotle as an ally in the promotion of the idea that emotions, rather than being blind, obstructive impulses, are intrinsically connected with our thoughts, judgements and wishes. The impact of these ideas, however, must be assessed against the background of Aristotle’s account of character virtues.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

Aristotle on Emotions in Law and PoliticsDispassionate Judges Encountering Hotheaded Aristotelians

Part of the Law and Philosophy Library Book Series (volume 121)
Editors: Huppes-Cluysenaer, Liesbeth; Coelho, Nuno M.M.S.
Rapp, Christof
Aristotle on Emotions in Law and Politics — Feb 14, 2018
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Publisher
Springer International Publishing
Copyright
© Springer International Publishing AG 2018
ISBN
978-3-319-66702-7
Pages
27 –49
DOI
10.1007/978-3-319-66703-4_3
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[It has traditionally been assumed that a judge should pass judgement in a rather dispassionate state of mind. More recently, this traditional assumption has been challenged by authors who claim that emotions such as compassion, indignation or anger are not only indispensable, but can even play a beneficial and important role in judicial decision-making. Thus the old ideal of the impassionate judge is challenged by the new ideal of the rightly compassionate, rightly indignant or even rightly angry judge. Some supporters of this new ideal of an emotionally engaged judge invoke Aristotle for the idea that a judge should feel the right emotions in the right way. This paper argues that although there are passages in Aristotle that might be understood as implying such views, Aristotle’s account of the right emotions of a virtuous person does not lend support to an ideal of passionate judges. On the contrary, the author points to contexts in which Aristotle seems to be rather concerned about the possibility of judges who pass their judgement in an emotional state. It is entirely justified to regard Aristotle as an ally in the promotion of the idea that emotions, rather than being blind, obstructive impulses, are intrinsically connected with our thoughts, judgements and wishes. The impact of these ideas, however, must be assessed against the background of Aristotle’s account of character virtues.]

Published: Feb 14, 2018

Keywords: Aristotle; Character virtue; Emotion; Emotion regulation; Judicial anger; Virtue ethics

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