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Axiomatic characterizations of solutions for Bayesian games

Axiomatic characterizations of solutions for Bayesian games Abstract Bayesian equilibria are characterized by means of consistency and one-person rationality in combination with non-emptiness or converse consistency. Moreover, strong and coalition-proof Bayesian equilibria of extended Bayesian games are introduced and it is seen that these notions can be characterized by means of consistency, one-person rationality, a version of Pareto optimality and a modification of converse consistency. It is shown that, in case of the strong Bayesian equilibrium correspondence, converse consistency can be replaced by non-emptiness. As examples we treat Bayesian potential games and Bayesian congestion games. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Theory and Decision Springer Journals

Axiomatic characterizations of solutions for Bayesian games

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References (15)

Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
1996 Kluwer Academic Publishers
ISSN
0040-5833
eISSN
1573-7187
DOI
10.1007/BF00133169
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Abstract Bayesian equilibria are characterized by means of consistency and one-person rationality in combination with non-emptiness or converse consistency. Moreover, strong and coalition-proof Bayesian equilibria of extended Bayesian games are introduced and it is seen that these notions can be characterized by means of consistency, one-person rationality, a version of Pareto optimality and a modification of converse consistency. It is shown that, in case of the strong Bayesian equilibrium correspondence, converse consistency can be replaced by non-emptiness. As examples we treat Bayesian potential games and Bayesian congestion games.

Journal

Theory and DecisionSpringer Journals

Published: Mar 1, 1996

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