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Belief, Evidence, and UncertaintyInitial Difficulties Dispelled

Belief, Evidence, and Uncertainty: Initial Difficulties Dispelled [In our view, data confirm a hypothesis just in case they increase its probability; they constitute evidence for one hypothesis vis-à-vis others just in case they are more probable on it than on its available rivals. In subsequent chapters, we go on to clarify and amplify the confirmation/evidence distinction. Before doing so, however, we need to consider various objections that might be made, not to the distinction itself but to the way in which we have formulated its principal elements. Four of these objections are standard in the literature. The first, third, and fourth raise questions concerning our analyses of both confirmation and evidence; the second has to do more narrowly with the application of Bayesian methods. Each suggests a different way in which our intentions in this monograph might be misunderstood.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

Belief, Evidence, and UncertaintyInitial Difficulties Dispelled

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Publisher
Springer International Publishing
Copyright
© The Author(s) 2016
ISBN
978-3-319-27770-7
Pages
49 –60
DOI
10.1007/978-3-319-27772-1_4
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[In our view, data confirm a hypothesis just in case they increase its probability; they constitute evidence for one hypothesis vis-à-vis others just in case they are more probable on it than on its available rivals. In subsequent chapters, we go on to clarify and amplify the confirmation/evidence distinction. Before doing so, however, we need to consider various objections that might be made, not to the distinction itself but to the way in which we have formulated its principal elements. Four of these objections are standard in the literature. The first, third, and fourth raise questions concerning our analyses of both confirmation and evidence; the second has to do more narrowly with the application of Bayesian methods. Each suggests a different way in which our intentions in this monograph might be misunderstood.]

Published: Mar 5, 2016

Keywords: Theory acceptance; Probabilistic measures; The “simple rule”; “Certain” data

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