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Cartelization, Cartel Breakdown, and Price Behavior: Evidence from the German Cement Industry

Cartelization, Cartel Breakdown, and Price Behavior: Evidence from the German Cement Industry We use a unique dataset of about 340,000 market transactions from 36 smaller and larger customers of German cement producers to study the price behavior before and after the breakdown of a German cement cartel. We find that, first, while the cartel agreement was active, cartel members set higher list prices than non-cartel members; however, larger rebates granted by the cartel members led to similar transaction prices. Second, after the cartel breakdown, both cartel- and non-cartel members reduced transaction prices to a far larger extent than list prices. We build on these results and discuss implications for competition policy. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png "Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade" Springer Journals

Cartelization, Cartel Breakdown, and Price Behavior: Evidence from the German Cement Industry

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References (56)

Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2015 by Springer Science+Business Media New York
Subject
Economics; Industrial Organization; Economic Policy; R & D/Technology Policy; European Integration; Microeconomics; International Economics
ISSN
1566-1679
eISSN
1573-7012
DOI
10.1007/s10842-015-0204-x
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

We use a unique dataset of about 340,000 market transactions from 36 smaller and larger customers of German cement producers to study the price behavior before and after the breakdown of a German cement cartel. We find that, first, while the cartel agreement was active, cartel members set higher list prices than non-cartel members; however, larger rebates granted by the cartel members led to similar transaction prices. Second, after the cartel breakdown, both cartel- and non-cartel members reduced transaction prices to a far larger extent than list prices. We build on these results and discuss implications for competition policy.

Journal

"Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade"Springer Journals

Published: Sep 17, 2015

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