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Collusion and Facilitating Practices: A New Perspective in Antitrust Analysis

Collusion and Facilitating Practices: A New Perspective in Antitrust Analysis A systematic revision of the notion of facilitating practices is put forward in this paper, with the purpose of relaxing the long-debated tension between economic and legal perspectives on oligopoly. Whereas the law knows of just one collusive illegal conduct, namely agreements, in economic theory the focus on internal enforcement makes the distinction between agreements and other behaviour resulting in the collusive outcome irrelevant. However, the tension may be relaxed, at least in a number of relevant circumstances, provided the focus of competition law shifts from straightforward co-ordination on market strategies to the firms' concerted efforts in the design and implementation of given organisational arrangements of the oligopolistic industry, to which an anticompetitive object can be attached. The theoretical analysis is extensively supported by examples drawn from some recent decisions of the European Commission and the Italian Competition Authority. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png European Journal of Law and Economics Springer Journals

Collusion and Facilitating Practices: A New Perspective in Antitrust Analysis

European Journal of Law and Economics , Volume 14 (2) – Oct 10, 2004

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References (18)

Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2002 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Subject
Economics; Law and Economics; European Integration; Public Finance; Commercial Law
ISSN
0929-1261
eISSN
1572-9990
DOI
10.1023/A:1016506925486
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

A systematic revision of the notion of facilitating practices is put forward in this paper, with the purpose of relaxing the long-debated tension between economic and legal perspectives on oligopoly. Whereas the law knows of just one collusive illegal conduct, namely agreements, in economic theory the focus on internal enforcement makes the distinction between agreements and other behaviour resulting in the collusive outcome irrelevant. However, the tension may be relaxed, at least in a number of relevant circumstances, provided the focus of competition law shifts from straightforward co-ordination on market strategies to the firms' concerted efforts in the design and implementation of given organisational arrangements of the oligopolistic industry, to which an anticompetitive object can be attached. The theoretical analysis is extensively supported by examples drawn from some recent decisions of the European Commission and the Italian Competition Authority.

Journal

European Journal of Law and EconomicsSpringer Journals

Published: Oct 10, 2004

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