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Conceptual JurisprudenceNot Everything Is Normativity: A Critique to Plunkett and Shapiro’s Account of General Jurisprudence

Conceptual Jurisprudence: Not Everything Is Normativity: A Critique to Plunkett and Shapiro’s... [This chapter offers a critical analysis of David Plunkett and Scott Shapiro’s novel account of general jurisprudence, which parallels this field to metaethics. We hold that this conception requires legal discourse to be exclusively normative, which is problematic on two counts. On the one hand, many important jurisprudes deny that, strictly speaking, legal discourse is normative in any relevant sense. On the other hand, even if we concede that part of legal discourse is normative, Plunkett and Shapiro’s conception of what general jurisprudence is about would not illuminate an important part of legal thought and talk that is descriptive. If our observations are correct, it is hard to appreciate the programmatic appeal of Plunkett and Shapiro’s proposal. Contrary to what they think, their account does not illuminate existing positions in general jurisprudence and cannot be used by legal scholars to advance the philosophical discussion in some important respects about legal thought, talk, and what, if any, such thought and talk are about.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

Conceptual JurisprudenceNot Everything Is Normativity: A Critique to Plunkett and Shapiro’s Account of General Jurisprudence

Part of the Law and Philosophy Library Book Series (volume 137)
Editors: Fabra-Zamora, Jorge Luis; Villa Rosas, Gonzalo
Luque, Pau; Martínez Torres, Ismael
Conceptual Jurisprudence — Sep 2, 2021
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References (21)

Publisher
Springer International Publishing
Copyright
© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021
ISBN
978-3-030-78802-5
Pages
239 –263
DOI
10.1007/978-3-030-78803-2_14
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[This chapter offers a critical analysis of David Plunkett and Scott Shapiro’s novel account of general jurisprudence, which parallels this field to metaethics. We hold that this conception requires legal discourse to be exclusively normative, which is problematic on two counts. On the one hand, many important jurisprudes deny that, strictly speaking, legal discourse is normative in any relevant sense. On the other hand, even if we concede that part of legal discourse is normative, Plunkett and Shapiro’s conception of what general jurisprudence is about would not illuminate an important part of legal thought and talk that is descriptive. If our observations are correct, it is hard to appreciate the programmatic appeal of Plunkett and Shapiro’s proposal. Contrary to what they think, their account does not illuminate existing positions in general jurisprudence and cannot be used by legal scholars to advance the philosophical discussion in some important respects about legal thought, talk, and what, if any, such thought and talk are about.]

Published: Sep 2, 2021

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