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Description of SituationsUnthought Thoughts

Description of Situations: Unthought Thoughts [5.1 Why a thought is invisible for Frege: Travis[aut] Travis, C., on the abstractedness that can be extracted from our “representing-as”—Thoughts and concepts: the “conceptual” as a referential domain, which does not possess the objectivity of the “non-conceptual”—The intermediation made by the “representing-as” as a form of judging—Travis’ rejection of any internalism—Reassessing psychologism: Russell[aut] Russell, B.,’s criticism of Frege’s[aut] Frege, G., conception of thought—Travis’[aut] Travis, C., suggestion of a Wittgensteinian view that takes into account the sociability of thinking. 5.2 Travis’ reluctance in admitting unthought thoughts beyond the workings of language—Problems of perception: perceptive presentations and representations—The case of analogical, non-perceptive representations—Language and thought reconsidered—Frege[aut] Frege, G., on fictional and real thoughts: a problem of modality—The anonymous character of thought. 5.3 Aquinas[aut] Aquinas, St. T., and the recognition that there are truths which escape our attention—Knowing and guessing: the transcendental impossibility of representing what we do not know—Scientific predictableness—Aquinas’ two kinds of intellection: “divine” and “human”—Distinction between actual and potential knowledge—The peril of determinism.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

Description of SituationsUnthought Thoughts

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Publisher
Springer International Publishing
Copyright
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018
ISBN
978-3-030-00153-7
Pages
35 –40
DOI
10.1007/978-3-030-00154-4_5
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[5.1 Why a thought is invisible for Frege: Travis[aut] Travis, C., on the abstractedness that can be extracted from our “representing-as”—Thoughts and concepts: the “conceptual” as a referential domain, which does not possess the objectivity of the “non-conceptual”—The intermediation made by the “representing-as” as a form of judging—Travis’ rejection of any internalism—Reassessing psychologism: Russell[aut] Russell, B.,’s criticism of Frege’s[aut] Frege, G., conception of thought—Travis’[aut] Travis, C., suggestion of a Wittgensteinian view that takes into account the sociability of thinking. 5.2 Travis’ reluctance in admitting unthought thoughts beyond the workings of language—Problems of perception: perceptive presentations and representations—The case of analogical, non-perceptive representations—Language and thought reconsidered—Frege[aut] Frege, G., on fictional and real thoughts: a problem of modality—The anonymous character of thought. 5.3 Aquinas[aut] Aquinas, St. T., and the recognition that there are truths which escape our attention—Knowing and guessing: the transcendental impossibility of representing what we do not know—Scientific predictableness—Aquinas’ two kinds of intellection: “divine” and “human”—Distinction between actual and potential knowledge—The peril of determinism.]

Published: Oct 31, 2018

Keywords: Fiction; Frege; Perception; Psychologism; Representing-as; Travis

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