Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
Loading next page...
/lp/springer-journals/discretionary-policy-strategic-complementarity-and-tax-evasion-a-UKaCEhpaJ0
References (52)
-
Isabel Sánchez, J. Sobel (1993)
Hierarchical design and enforcement of income tax policiesJournal of Public Economics, 50
-
A. Santoro, C. Fiorio (2011)
Taxpayer Behavior When Audit Rules Are Known: Evidence from ItalyPublic Finance Review, 39
-
M. Allingham, A. Sandmo (1972)
Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysisJournal of Public Economics, 1
-
S. Pisani (2014)
. An approach to assess how the activity of the Italian revenue agency affects compliance -
Frank Cowell (2009)
Tax compliance and firms' strategic interdependence☆ -
R. Convenevole (2007)
. Gli effetti dell?applicazione degli studi di settore in termini di ampliamento delle basi imponibili -
Italian Agency, S. Pisani (2014)
AN APPROACH TO ASSESS HOW THE ACTIVITY OF THE -
A Wolman R King (2004)
Monetary discretion, pricing complementarity, and dynamic multiple equilibriaQuarterly Journal of Economics, 119
-
Journal of Economic Perspectives—Volume 19, Number 4—Fall 2005—Pages 43–66 Individual Irrationality and Aggregate Outcomes -
J. Alm, M. McKee (2003)
Tax Compliance as a Coordination Game -
Jennifer Reinganum, Louis Wilde (1985)
INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE IN A PRINCIPAL-AGENT FRAMEWORKJournal of Public Economics, 26
-
A. Santoro (2008)
TAXPAYERS’CHOICES UNDER STUDI DI SETTORE:WHAT DO WE KNOW AND HOW WE CAN INTERPRET IT?Giornale degli economisti e annali di economia, 67
-
A Yim (2009)
Efficient committed budget for implementing target audit probability for many inspecteesManagement Science, 55
-
(1997)
Optimal audit policy with heterogeneous incomes sources -
J. Huyck, R. Battalio, Richard Beil (1990)
Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination FailureThe American Economic Review, 80
-
JR Tyran E Fehr (2005)
Individual irrationality and aggregate outcomesJournal of Economic Perspectives, 19
-
(2014)
Dynamic analysis of tax compliance in Italy -
Russell Cooper, A. John (1988)
Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian ModelsQuarterly Journal of Economics, 103
-
F Privileggi C Marchese (2009)
A model of the Italian cut-off system for taxing small businessesResearch in Economics, 63
-
A. Rapoport, T. Schelling (1961)
The Strategy of Conflict.Journal of the American Statistical Association, 56
-
(2015)
Allegato: Rapporto sui Risultati Conseguiti in Materia di Misure di Contrasto dell'Evasione Fiscale -
B. Chiarini, M. Domizio, E. Marzano (2009)
Why Do Underground Reducing Policies Often Fail Their Scope? Some Answers from the Italian ExperiencePolitical Economy: Taxation
-
(2006)
L’evasione fiscale: Un problema economico e sociale per il paese -
LA Franzoni (2004)
Discretion in tax enforcementEconomica, 71
-
Carla Marchese, F. Privileggi (2007)
A Model of the Italian Cut-Off System for Taxing Small BusinessesLaw & Economics: Public Law (Topic)
-
(2008)
Commissione di studio -
G. Arachi, A. Santoro (2008)
Tax Enforcement for SMEs: Lessons from the Italian Experience?, 2007
-
C. Fiorio, S. Iacus, A. Santoro (2013)
Taxpaying Response of Small Firms to an Increased Probability of Audit: Some Evidence from ItalyERN: Tax Evasion (Topic)
-
Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze (2015)
. Nota di Aggiornamento del Documento di Economia e Finanza 2015. Allegato: Rapporto sui Risultati Conseguiti in Materia di Misure di Contrasto dell?Evasione Fiscale -
A. Santoro (2006)
Evasione e studi di settore. Quali risultati? Quali prospettive? -
(2009)
Evasione fiscale e dimensione di impresa -
R. King, Alexander Wolman (2003)
Monetary Discretion, Pricing Complementarity and Dynamic Multiple EquilibriaInternational Finance
-
Andrew Yim (2009)
Efficient Committed Budget for Implementing Target Audit Probability for Many InspecteesEnvironmental Economics
-
J. Huyck, R. Battalio, Richard Beil (1991)
Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion GamesQuarterly Journal of Economics, 106
-
S. Pisani (2006)
. Analisi dell?evasione fondata sui dati IRAP?anni 1998?2002. Documento di lavoro dell?Ufficio Studi dell?Agenzia delle Entrate -
A. Braiotta (2015)
//www1.agenziaentrate.it/ufficiostudi. Accessed Feb 2015. -
George Akerlof, Janet Yellen (1985)
Can Small Deviations from Rationality Make Significant Differences to Economic EquilibriaThe American Economic Review, 75
-
(2007)
Gli effetti dell’applicazione degli studi di settore in termini di ampliamento delle basi imponibili, Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze -
D Pérez-Castrillo I Macho-Stadler (2004)
Settlement in tax evasion prosecutionEconomica (Special Issue), 71
-
M. Bottone (2014)
. Dynamic analysis of tax compliance in Italy. Ministry on Economy -
A. Farina (2009)
//www1.agenziaentrate.it/ufficiostudi. -
Ministry of Economics (2008)
. Commissione di studio. Le problematiche di tipo giuridico ed economico inerenti alla materia degli Studi di Settore -
(2006)
Analisi dell’evasione fondata sui dati IRAP—anni 1998–2002 -
(1998)
Documento di lavoro dell'Ufficio Studi dell'Agenzia delle Entrate -
V. Visco (2006)
. L?evasione fiscale: Un problema economico e sociale per il paese. Scuola di Polizia Tributaria della Guardia di Finanza -
(1990)
Cheating the government -
M Domizio B Chiarini (2009)
Why do underground reducing policies often fail their scope? Some answers from the Italian experienceEconomics and Politics, 21
-
L. Franzoni (2004)
Discretion in Tax EnforcementPublic Economics eJournal
-
Inés Macho-Stadler, David Pérez-Castrillo (2002)
Settlement in Tax Evasion ProsecutionWiley-Blackwell: Economica
-
F. Busato, B. Chiarini (2004)
Market and underground activities in a two-sector dynamic equilibrium modelEconomic Theory, 23
-
(2008)
Tax Rates and Tax Evasion: An Empirical Analysis of the Structural Aspects and Long-Run Characteristics in Italy -
S. Pisani (2004)
. Il triathlon degli studi di settore
- Publisher
- Springer Journals
- Copyright
- 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland
- ISSN
- 1120-2890
- eISSN
- 1973-820X
- DOI
- 10.1007/s40888-016-0024-4
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
Abstract Underlying this work is the idea that there is a problem of strategic complementarity of individuals who choose to evade. Complementarity results from the discretionary policies of governments and the strategic implications of the Studi di Settore (sector studies), the mechanism used in Italy to evaluate the income (in reality, the turnover) of professional categories and small firms. In the Italian case, policy discretion and the sector studies lead to a failure of the coordination mechanism of taxpayers and confer a strong advantage for the coordination mechanism of tax evaders. The outcome is a coordination failure where individuals converge to the least efficient equilibrium from a social perspective.
Journal
"Economia Politica" – Springer Journals
Published: Apr 1, 2016