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Disparities in the impacts of co-management on fishers’ livelihoods

Disparities in the impacts of co-management on fishers’ livelihoods Natural resources are widely managed through collaborative governance arrangements (e.g., co-management) which often result in the uneven distribution of costs and benefits among fishers. Discrepancies in how a fisher is impacted by co-man- agement relative to other fishers or others in the community (i.e., disparity) can negatively affect fishers’ wellbeing, their support for management, and subsequently, ecological outcomes. Yet, disparities in the distribution of social impacts from co-management have rarely been assessed. We address this gap by examining disparities (losses and gains) in perceived liveli- hood impacts from co-management. Losses (or gains) occur when a fisher experiences a more negative (or positive) impact on their livelihood relative to other s fi hers or others in the community. We used data from interviews with 1191 s fi hers associated with 48 coral reef co-management arrangements across Kenya, Tanzania, Madagascar, Indonesia, and Papua New Guinea to examine how socioeconomic and institutional characteristics were associated with losses and gains from co-management. Overall, we found that more fishers perceived equality than disparities in the distribution of co-management impacts. Of those that perceived disparities, more fishers perceived losses than gains. We also found that disparities could be predicted by a range of socioeconomic characteristics, including distance to markets and wealth, and institutional characteristics of the co-management regime, such as gear, access, and area restrictions. This study provides insights on potential entry points that could be used by managers and policy-makers to promote equitable co-management of small-scale fisheries, such as the reduction of losses by increasing participation in decision-making processes, fostering conflict resolution mechanisms, prioritizing gear restrictions over area restrictions, and reducing poverty. Keywords Inequality · Equity · Fisheries livelihoods · Socioeconomic impacts · Institutional design principles · Natural resource management Introduction is intended to be a collaborative and participatory process often involving communities, governments, civil society, Common-pool resources across the world—including for- and research institutions (Berkes 2009), and aims to pro- ests, fisheries, and pastures—are commonly governed under vide a degree of decision-making power to people who are co-management governance arrangements (Berkes 2009; affected by management decisions. By facilitating the incor - Oldekop et al. 2016; Gelcich et al. 2019). Co-management poration of local values, needs, governance, and priorities, co-management is thought to lead to better outcomes for local people than more centralized governance approaches Handled by Patrik J. G. Henriksson, Stockholm Resilience (Berkes 2009). Studies suggest that co-management can lead Centre, Sweden. to both positive outcomes such as increased participation * Cristina Ruano-Chamorro and empowerment (d’Armengol et al. 2018; Oldekop et al. cristina.ruanochamorro@my.jcu.edu.au 2016; Yang and Pomeroy 2017) and negative outcomes such as inequalities including unequal access to decision-making College of Arts, Society and Education, James Cook (Bene et al. 2009) and uneven distribution of costs and ben- University, Douglas, QLD, Australia efits among local people (Cinner et al. 2014; Gurney et al. Instituto Milenio en Socio-Ecología Costera (SECOS), 2015; Ward et al. 2018). However, a clear understanding Santiago, Chile of how positive and negative impacts are experienced and Center of Applied Ecology and Sustainability, Facultad de Ciencias Biológicas, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago, Chile Vol.:(0123456789) 1 3 Sustainability Science perceived by the diverse members within communities is still lacking (Quimby and Levine 2018; Gibbes and Keys 2010). Discrepancies on how an individual is impacted relative to others in the community (i.e., disparities) have important implications for social and ecological outcomes (Pascual et  al. 2014; Hamann et al. 2018). When co-management costs fall on those who are most deprived, disparities can further harm the most vulnerable people, increasing pov- erty and deepening social inequalities (Adams et al. 2004; Persha and Andersson 2014). Perceived disparities can influ- ence peoples’ attitudes and their willingness to engage with management initiatives (Fabinyi et al. 2015; Hamann et al. 2018). In particular, if disparities are considered unfair, management support and cooperation can be undermined, leading to social conflicts and non-compliance (Gurney et al. 2014), and ultimately, to hampering management success (Loomis and Ditton 1993; Pascual et al. 2014; Fabinyi et al. 2015). Indeed, scholarship on distributional equity from Fig. 1 Map with co-management sites in a Kenya and Tanzania, b Madagascar, c Indonesia, and d Papua New Guinea. Approximate psychology suggests that preferences for equitable distribu- locations of co-management sites are indicated with red dots tions are rooted in neurological and psychological processes, and are strongly related to attitudes, beliefs and behavior, including legitimacy and collective action (Dawes et  al. According to the theory of relative deprivation, the per- 2007; Nishi et al. 2015; Tyler 2015). Importantly, subjective ception of being a loser can negatively affect people’s well- wellbeing has been shown to be strongly related to percep- being (Crosby 1976; Smith et al. 2012). Therefore, in the tions of (un)fair disparities (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009; context of co-management, promoting perceptions of not Prilleltensky 2012). being a loser may be important for promoting subjective Given the implications of distributional inequity on the wellbeing, and support for management. In addition, under- social and ecological outcomes of co-management, dispari- standing the social conditions associated with disparities in ties in socioeconomic impacts are a key consideration for co-management outcomes is essential to informing targeted co-management decision-makers. Depending on the context, policies and practices that account for equity issues. decision-makers may be interested in promoting equality or Despite the importance of understanding disparities in even certain types of disparities. For instance, management co-management, it remains unclear the degree to which co- strategies may be focused on promoting winners without management leads to disparities (i.e., objective disparity), increasing losers (i.e., making people better off without mak - the degree to which disparities are perceived (i.e., subjective ing anyone worse off) (Pareto 1906). In addition, strategies disparity), and what socioeconomic and institutional charac- may be focused on managing subjective or perceived dispar- teristics are related to these disparities. Indeed, the literature ities, which are considered a stronger predictor of individual on inequality and environmental management has largely and social outcomes than objective measures of disparity focused on economic inequality (i.e., wealth or income) and (Nishi et al. 2015; Hauser and Norton 2017; Starmans et al. its role as a driver of outcomes (Baland et al. 2007; Persha 2017). and Andersson 2014; Hamann et al. 2018), and on differ - ential impacts among occupational or social groups (e.g., gender and religion) (Gurney et al. 2015; Ward et al. 2018; 1 Gill et al. 2019). Following McClanahan et al. 2012, we use disparity to refer to dis- crepancies in perceived benefits (and/or costs) between an individual In this paper, we build on this existing work by quanti- fisher and other fishers or the community more generally. The dis- fying how specific socioeconomic and institutional charac- parity metric in our analysis is measure of the distribution of liveli- teristics relate to two types of disparities (subjective and hood impacts from co-management and has three categories: losses, objective) in livelihood impacts from coral reef co-manage- equality, and gains. Equality and equity are often used interchange- ably in the literature, yet they are distinct concepts (McDermott et al. ment for 1191 fishers across 48 co-management arrange- 2013). Equality refers to the equal distribution of benefits and/or costs ments in five Indo-Pacific countries (Figs.  1, 2). We used among individuals or groups (i.e., the absence of disparity), and is household surveys to elicit two forms of disparity based on one potential distribution that could be considered equitable. Distri- five-point Likert-type rating scale about the impacts of co- butional equity refers to the fair distribution of benefits and/or costs among individuals or groups (McDermott et al. 2013). management on: (1) the respondent’s livelihood and (2) the 1 3 Sustainability Science (approval number H3020). Prior informed oral consent from participants was obtained. Written consent was not obtained due to low literacy rates. Disparity metric (response variables) We asked fishers to indicate: (1) the degree to which they perceived co-management had a positive, neutral, or nega- tive impact on their livelihoods (individual impact). Liveli- hood was conceptualized and explained as a broad concept of wellbeing (not solely referring to employment) (Allison and Ellis 2001); and (2) the degree to which they perceived co-management had a positive, neutral, negative impact on the broader community (community impact). Both responses were on a 5-point Likert-type scale, 1 being very negative impact on livelihoods, 5 very positive impact, and 3 being Fig. 2 Subjective and objective disparity metrics in our study. Sub- neither positive nor negative. From these questions, we cre- jective disparity refers to the level of impact that an individual fisher ated two metrics of disparity, which we refer to as subjective perceived to receive from co-management, minus the impact that and objective disparity (Fig. 2): individual fisher perceived the community receives. Objective dispar - ity refers to the level of impact that an individual fisher respondent Subjective disparity was calculated by subtracting a perceived to receive from co-management, minus the average of the impact perceived by all sampled fishers in the community. Each dis- respondent’s score for community impact from their parity metric was broken down into three categories: (a) losses (sub- score for individual impact. Subjective disparity thus jective disparity < 0; objective disparity < −  0.5); (b) equality (sub- captures whether the respondent self-identifies as a jective disparity = 0; objective disparity ≥ −  0.5 and ≤ 0.5); (c) gains winner or loser (i.e., perceived relative position of the (subjective gain > 0; objective gain > 0.5) individual within the community), which may affect their perceptions, attitudes, and behavior (e.g., relative wider community (Fig. 2). These surveys were also used in deprivation) (Crosby 1976). combination with key informant interviews to examine 17 Objective disparity was calculated by subtracting socioeconomic and institutional conditions expected to be the community’s mean individual impact from each related to co-management outcomes. respondents’ individual impact score. Objective dis- parity is thus the relative position of the respondent among sampled fishers (i.e., level of impact a fisher Materials and methods perceives to have received relative to other fishers in their community). Although it may not necessar- Study sites and sampling approach ily be perceived by respondents, research has shown that objective disparity matters for people’s wellbeing We studied 48 independent coral reef fisheries co-manage- (Townsend 1987; Wilkinson and Pickett 2009). The ment arrangements spanning five Indo-Pacific countries: uneven allocation of costs and benefits may increase Kenya, Tanzania, Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, and Mada- existing inequalities and levels of poverty and lead to gascar (Fig. 1) (Cinner et al. 2012). We used purposive sam- social conflict and a wide range of governance prob- pling to ensure variation in our predictor variables (i.e., dif- lems (Persha and Andersson 2014). ferent levels of market integration and population). To gather information and triangulate results in each study site, we Thus, our subjective metric considers how a fisher thinks employed a combination of household surveys, semi-struc- the community benefits, while the objective measure inte- tured interviews with community leaders, co-management grates perceptions of sampled fishers (Fig.  2). We broke organization leaders, and other key informants (knowledge- down subjective and objective disparity metrics into three able fishers, elders, and other stakeholders), and analyses of categories each (losses, equality, gains). Values equal to zero secondary sources such as population censuses. In total, we (or between 0.5 and − 0.5 in the case of objective dispar- conducted 1191 resource user interviews, 53 key informant ity metric) were categorized as equality, values below zero interviews, 54 community leader interviews, and 51 organi- (or below 0.5) were categorized as losses, and values above zational leader interviews. This study was part of a project zero (or 0.5) were categorized as gains. Losses occur when focused on household heads, who were mostly men. This a fisher experiences a more negative impact relative to the research was approved by the JCU Human Ethics Committee rest of the community (or fishers in the case of objective 1 3 Sustainability Science disparity), gains occur when a fisher experiences a more right and fair (Ruano-Chamorro et al. 2022). At the commu- positive impact relative to the rest of the community (or fish- nity level, proximity to markets may positively impact local ers), while equality occurs when a fisher experiences same livelihoods by providing access to resources and economic impacts relative to the rest of the community (or fishers). opportunities (Bene et al. 2010), although it may crowd out Hence, we obtained four response variables, which related to intrinsic incentives (Cinner et al. 2021). In addition, large whether fisher experienced or perceived an equality outcome population size can diminish or enhance collective action versus an: (1) objective gain; (2) objective loss; (3) subjec- (Poteete and Ostrom 2004) and thus the delivery of equitable tive gain; and (4) subjective loss. For example, a subjective livelihood outcomes to local communities. gain would be when a fisher perceives that he or she benefits We examined seven key characteristics that were more than he or she perceives the community benefits. An informed by Ostrom’s eight design principles for devolved objective gain refers to when a fisher’s perception of the commons management (Ostrom 1990). Institutional char- impact to their livelihood is higher than the average of all acteristics are key to understanding the likelihood of col- sampled fishers’ perceptions from that community. lective action and, thus, the possibility of achieving eco- logical and social benefits (Ostrom 1990) and can influence Socioeconomic and institutional characteristics how users receive and perceive benefits and costs (Cinner (predictor variables) et al. 2012). Clear defined boundaries and operational rules can exclude certain people or social groups, negatively We examined the relationship between disparities and 17 impacting their livelihoods while benefiting others, leading socioeconomic and institutional characteristics, which were to unequal distribution of impacts in the community. The selected based on institutional analysis theory (Ostrom operational rules considered in this study include access 2009) and their relevance to this specific context according restrictions (i.e., restricted or prohibited access to fishing to co-management theory and research (Cinner et al. 2012; grounds to non-members), area restrictions (i.e., prohibi- Ward et al. 2018; Gurney et al. 2019; Epstein et al. 2021) (SI tion of fishing in certain areas) and gear restrictions (i.e., Appendix, Table S1). prohibition of certain gears). Participation in resource We examined eight individual-level and two community- management decision-making is key to achieve procedural level socioeconomic characteristics (SI Appendix, Table S1) equity (Ruano-Chamorro et al. 2022) and good governance which can influence whether people engage in collective (Lockwood 2010). Specifically, active participation of local resource management (Ostrom 2009; Ward et  al. 2018; users in decision-making processes can promote procedural Epstein et al. 2021) and how cost and benefits are distrib- fairness (Ruano-Chamorro et al. 2022) and, thus, equita- uted (Gurney et al. 2015; Gill et al. 2019). Socioeconomic ble distribution of outcomes. Graduated sanctions promote characteristics, such as gender, migrant status, wealth, and compliance by punishing severe or repeated rule violations education, shape hierarchical structures that privilege cer- (Ostrom 1990) and can increase the likelihood of obtain- tain individuals (e.g., wealthy and highly educated people) ing both benefits and costs from co-management (Cinner while marginalizing others (e.g., women and migrant) who et al. 2012), while the presence of effective mechanisms to are often excluded from decision-making processes and solve conflicts in co-management arrangements is essential bear the costs of management (Persha and Andersson 2014; to promote equity (Gurney et al. 2019; Ruano-Chamorro McClanahan and Abunge 2016; Gustavsson et al. 2021). In et al. 2022). A more detailed description of institutional and addition, participation in community events can increase socioeconomic characteristics that can influence social out- social capital and promote management equity (Diedrich comes in co-management arrangements is provided in SI et al. 2017), but also exacerbate inequalities as those indi- Appendix, Table S1. viduals with more connections may have more ability to inu fl ence decisions and benet fi from co-management (Smith Analyses 2012). Fishery dependency, operationalized here as primary marine livelihood and occupational diversity, can also influ- We conducted four mixed effect binomial logistic regres- ence how fishers benefit from co-management (Cinner et al. sion models, including site as random effect, to quan- 2012; Aaron MacNeil and Cinner 2013). For instance, highly tify the relationship between the predictor variables and dependent fishers may be more vulnerable to restrictions the likelihood of an equality outcome vs subjective loss than those with lower dependency and experience higher (model 1), subjective gains (model 2), objective losses negative impacts from co-management (McClanahan et al. (model 3), and objective gains (model 4). For example, in 2009). Finally, trust in leaders may influence perceived ben- model 1, we examined what differentiates those experienc- efits and disparity because fishers who trust leaders may ing subjective losses from those experiencing subjective perceive that management is effective (Jones et al. 2017) and equality. Similarly, in model 2, we examined what differ - that leaders take into account their interests and do what is entiates those experiencing subjective gains from those 1 3 Sustainability Science Objective Objective Objective Loss Equality Gain Subjective Loss Subjective Equality Fig. 3 Distribution of subjective and objective disparity metrics. A Percent of individual fishers who perceived more negative impacts from co-management relative to the community (red); the same impacts than the community (grey); and more positive impacts than the community (blue). B Percent of individual fishers who perceived more negative impacts from co-management relative to sampled fish- Subjec ve ers (red); the same impacts relative to sampled fishers (black); and Gain more positive impacts relative to sampled fishers (red) Pearson residuals: experiencing subjective equality, and so on. We followed p-value = an information theoretic approach to model selection < 2.22e-16 (Grueber et al. 2011) (SI Appendix). -6.9-4.0 -2.00.0 2.0 4.08.7 Fig. 4 Mosaic plot and percentage of fishers experiencing combina- tions of objective and subjective disparity categories (losses, equal- ity, gains). The widths of the columns indicate the percentage of the Results number of observations in each objective disparity category, and the widths of the rows indicate the percentage of the number of obser- Equality was the most frequent category of the objective and vations in each subjective disparity category (e.g., 56% of fishers subjective disparity metric (i.e., losses, equality, and gains) experienced both objective and subjective losses, and 78% of fishers who experienced objective gains perceived subjective equality). Chi- and comprised the majority of outcomes in our subjective, square test and Pearson residuals are shown. Blue indicates that the but not our objective metric (Fig. 3). In other words, fishers observed value is higher than expected than if the data were random; generally perceived more equality (i.e., fishers felt they were red indicates that the observed value is lower than expected than if benefiting the same as the rest of the community) than what the data were random was measured in more objective terms (Fig.  3). The fre- quency of objective losses and gains was similar (Fig. 3B), while the frequency for subjective losses was higher than the Relationships between institutional frequency of subjective gains (Fig. 3A), meaning that fishers and socioeconomic characteristics and disparities were more likely to see themselves as losers than as winners relative to sampled fishers. We used four binomial mixed-effects models to examine Although objective and subjective disparities were how the likelihood of an equality response versus each of related (Chi square = 178.59, df = 4, p value < 2.22 e−16), the four different types of losses and gains were related to there were substantial variations in fishers’ objective com- seven institutional and 10 socioeconomic characteristics (SI pared to their subjective disparity (Fig.  4). Many fishers Appendix, Table S1) that have been previously shown to perceived subjective equality when experiencing objective be important in shaping co-management outcomes (Ostrom gains (n = 203) and objective losses (n = 102) (Fig. 4). Fur- 2009; Cinner et al. 2012; Ward et al. 2018; Gurney et al. thermore, it was more common for a fisher to perceive sub- 2019; Epstein et al. 2021). We found four socioeconomic jective losses when they experienced objective losses than characteristics and five institutional characteristics were sig- for a fisher to perceive subjective gains when experienc- nificantly related to disparities (Fig.  5). We also found that ing objective gains (i.e., 56% of the fishers experimenting overall, losses were more likely to be influenced by these objective losses perceived subjective losses, while only 16% characteristics as opposed to gains. of fishers experiencing objective gains perceived objective Socioeconomic characteristics were related to three of our gains) (Fig. 4). response variables (subjective losses, subjective gains, and 1 3 % Individuals Sustainability Science Fig. 5 Relationship between socioeconomic and institutional char- included as a random effect in the models. Error bars indicate 95% acteristics and subjective and objective disparity metrics. Relation- confidence interval. Effect sizes have been standardized by subtract- ships are indicated with the model-averaged standardized coefficient ing their mean and dividing by two times their standard deviation estimates of binomial logistic mixed effect models. Community is objective losses). Population size and participation in com- were more likely to experience negative impacts from munity events were the only socioeconomic characteristics access restrictions than other fishers in objective terms. related to both subjective and objective disparity (Fig. 5). In In contrast, fishers in communities with area restrictions communities with large population size, fishers were more were more likely to see themselves as losers, while in com- likely to see themselves as winners and losers relative to the munities with gear restrictions, fishers were less likely to rest of the community (i.e., experience subjective losses and experience objective losses relative to other fishers. Two gains), and were less likely to experience objective losses. additional institutional characteristics were related to dif- Fishers who participated in community events were more ferent types of disparities. Participation in the decision- likely to experience subjective gains and subjective losses, making process was negatively related to objective losses and more likely to experience objective losses. Wealth was (Fig. 5), suggesting that higher levels of participation in both negatively related to subjective losses and gains, and decision-making reduces objective losses (or promotes thus, wealthier fishers were less likely to perceive disparities equality). Finally, the presence of effective conflict reso- (both losses and gains). In addition, distance to markets was lution mechanisms was negatively related to subjective positively related to subjective losses. In other words, fishers losses (Fig. 5). living in communities with lower market access (i.e., farther from markets) were more likely to see themselves as losers. Institutional characteristics were related to two of our response variables (subjective losses and objective losses) Discussion (Fig. 5). Rules relating to access, gear, and area restric- tions had a different relationship with the two types of Together, our study revealed three key results with impor- disparities. Specifically, fishers in sites with access restric- tant implications for co-management. First, fishers can tions were less likely to perceive subjective losses but overestimate equal outcomes, and when they do perceive more likely to experience objective losses; fishers in sites disparities, losses are more likely to be perceived than with area restrictions were more likely to perceive sub- gains. Second, losses and gains were related to distinct jective losses, while fishers in sites with gear restrictions socioeconomic and institutional characteristics, with some were less likely to experience objective losses (Fig. 5). In characteristics related to only losses, and others to both other words, fishers affected by access restrictions were gains and losses. Our third key result is that socioeco- more likely to perceive being equally impacted by co- nomic and institutional characteristics tend to be related management relative to the community, although fishers to subjective or objective disparity. 1 3 Sustainability Science could then be targeted with additional support. In addi- Subjective and objective disparity tion, if further investigations reveal that the relationships between these socioeconomic and institutional characteris- Fishers perceived higher levels of equality (i.e., subjective equality) than indicated by the objective disparity meas- tics are causal, these characteristics could be used as levers for change. ure (i.e., objective equality). In other words, fishers may be perceiving that everyone in the community is similarly Losses were less likely to occur where there was par- ticipation in decision-making, conflict resolution mecha- impacted by co-management, even though co-management actually impacts some fishers more than others. Other stud- nisms, gear restrictions, absence of area restrictions, and in communities near markets. Participation in decision- ies have shown that co-management can be perceived as acceptable and fair even when it impacts some groups (e.g., making and effective conflict resolution mechanisms have been shown to promote perceptions of procedural equity women) more negatively than others (Kleiber et al. 2018; Lau et al. 2021). This may be because fishers perceive the (i.e., fair decision-making process) (Ruano-Chamorro et al. 2022), which in turn can lead to perceptions of distributional decision-making process of their respective co-manage- ment arrangements as fair, which may lead to perceptions equity. Gear restrictions in this context may reduce objective losses because coral reef fishers often use multiple gears, of equity or equality in co-management impacts (Gustavs- son et al. 2021) regardless of the actual distribution (Tyler or alternatively gear restrictions may be viewed as a means to reduce competition from fishers using other gears. As a 2015). In cases where disparities were perceived, we found that fishers perceived more than twice as many losses than result, fishers may be less vulnerable to gear restrictions than to other restrictions, such as area restrictions. Consistent gains. This result may be indicative of the concept of loss aversion, which refers to the cognitive bias that people have with our results, other studies have found that fishers often have more positive perceptions of gear than area restric- towards perceiving that losses hurt twice as much as the satisfaction of an equivalent gain (Kahneman and Tversky tions (McClanahan et al. 2012; Barley Kincaid et al. 2014; McClanahan and Abunge 2016). 1979). Indeed, we found that fishers perceived more sub- jective losses when they experienced objective losses com- Our finding that perceived losses were less likely in com- munities close to markets could be due to a number of mech- pared to their perception of subjective gains when they were experiencing objective gains. If they perceive these losses anisms. Market proximity may reduce dependency on mid- dlemen, potentially leading to higher bargaining power and as unfair, fishers may be experiencing relative deprivation (Crosby 1976; Smith et  al. 2012). This feeling of being earnings (Maire et al. 2020; Rojas et al. 2021). Alternatively, the relationship between market proximity and perceived worse off than others can lead to frustration, anxiety, dissat- isfaction, anger, or resentment and promote social conflicts, losses could be due to an increase in fishers’ preferences for equality. Indeed, research from human evolutionary biol- distrust, and anti-social behavior (Crosby 1976; Wilkinson and Pickett 2009; Smith et al. 2012). In a co-management ogy suggests that market integration gives rise to prosocial norms, including a preference for distributional equality, context, relative deprivation may lead to unethical and inef- ficient management interventions because it can negatively which can facilitate mutually beneficial exchanges among strangers who do not have established social relationships affect people’s wellbeing, reduce support for co-manage - ment (Gelcich et al. 2007; Wangel and Blomkvist 2013), and (e.g., kinship and reciprocity) (Henrich et al. 2010). Con- versely, other studies have found that market engagement ultimately lead to management failure. For instance, fishers in Texas felt relative deprivation because fishing regula - can reduce preferences for equal or pro-poor distribution of conservation benefits (Martin et al. 2019; Cinner et al. 2021; tions only affected them and not fishers who fish in other bays, which caused opposition towards fishing regulations Gurney et al. 2021) and lead to an unequal distribution of market benefits among fishers (Ferguson 2021). Indeed, the (Loomis and Ditton 1993). influence of markets on human preferences and behavior and, thus, conservation and management outcomes contin- How socioeconomic and institutional characteristics are related to disparities: losses and gains ues to be debated (Maire et al. 2020; Cinner et al. 2021). It is likely that the relationship is complex, being dependent Our second key finding is that losses and gains were related on the social-ecological context, and potentially non-linear (Epstein et al. 2021). to distinct socioeconomic and institutional characteristics, with some characteristics more likely to be related to only Both gains and losses were more likely to be experienced and/or perceived when fishers were poorer, more involved in losses (e.g., distance to markets, gear and area restrictions), and others more likely to be related to both gains and losses community events, and lived in communities with a larger population. Previous research has also shown that poorer (e.g., population size and wealth). These findings can help identify individuals and contexts in which undesirable out- fishers are more likely to perceive both negative and posi- tive impacts (e.g., fisheries displacement and higher catch) comes of co-management are more likely to result, which 1 3 Sustainability Science from marine protected areas in Kenya (Cinner et al. 2014). (Osei-tutu et al. 2021) and lead to perceptions of equality One possible explanation is that poorer people are more vul- (i.e., low subjective losses). nerable (Cinner et al. 2009), which means that any change Therefore, the conditions related to a fisher receiving to their livelihoods has a greater impact than on wealthy more losses or gains than other fishers are not always the people. Further, concerns about scarcity can influence cogni- same conditions that relate to the same fisher seeing them- tive processes (Shah et al. 2018), leading people to be more selves as a loser or a winner relative to the community psychologically sensitive to the impacts (both positive and they belong to. In essence, socioeconomic and institutional negative) of co-management. With regard to the positive characteristics may have different influences on how fishers’ relationship we found between involvement in community livelihoods are affected relative to other fishers (i.e., objec- events and the experience of both gains and losses, increased tive disparity), and on how fishers’ livelihoods are affected connectedness through these events could be exacerbating relative to how fishers perceive the community to be affected disparities and benefiting certain groups over others, as well (i.e., subjective disparity). These findings provide entry as making disparities within the community more visible points for managing for either subjective or objective dis- (Ballet et  al. 2007; Cook 2014). Lastly, the relationship parities. For example, to foster objective equality, managers between population size and management outcomes is com- may promote participation in decision-making and imple- plex, context-dependent (Poteete and Ostrom 2004), may ment gear restrictions rather than access restrictions. Alter- be non-linear (Aaron MacNeil and Cinner 2013), interacts natively, while objective equality is likely a frequent goal in with other factors (Aaron MacNeil and Cinner 2013), and is co-management, promoting subjective equality or percep- generally unclear. Therefore, further examination is required tions of being a winner might be an equally valid goal given to better understand the mechanisms through which popula- the influence of fairness perceptions on attitudes, behaviors, tion size shapes co-management disparities. and wellbeing. Thus, our study provides guidance on the different strategies that could be implemented depending on How socioeconomic and institutional characteristics the outcome of interest. are related to disparities: objective and subjective Limitations and future research Our third key finding is that socioeconomic and institutional characteristics tend to relate to either subjective or objective Our study takes an important first step in evaluating dif - disparity, with just three characteristics associated with both ferent types of disparity in co-management, and exploring types of metrics. For instance, conflict resolution was only how these outcomes are related to key socioeconomic and related to subjective disparity and participation in decision- institutional characteristics, but has some limitations that making was only related to objective disparity. Conflict reso- could be addressed in future studies. First, while our study lution mechanisms may provide tangible ways of solving provides some evidence of the direction and magnitude of problems within the community and reduce fishers’ percep- the relationship between disparities and the examined socio- tions of being a loser. Members of a community in Papua economic and institutional characteristics, it is not designed New Guinea regularly engage in collective reasoning of what to establish whether those relationships are causal. Future is fair and unfair during meetings, which facilitates a shared research could assess the causal effect of potential drivers of perception of equity within the community (Lau et al. 2021). equity, such as those suggested in this study, through impact A similar process may occur through effective conflict reso- evaluation, which involves focusing on design over meth- lution mechanisms, thus reducing the likelihood that fishers ods and the use of counterfactuals (Ferraro and Hanauer perceive that they are being more negatively impacted than 2014). A second limitation is that this study does not com- other members of the community. On the other hand, fish- pare co-managed sites with ‘control’ sites that are not under ers involved in decision-making, and thus possibly able to co-management arrangements. Future studies could include satisfy their needs for procedural equity and self-determina- different management arrangements (e.g., co-management, tion (Decaro and Stokes 2013), may tend to perceive simi- open access, and state-led) to better understand the relation- lar impacts from co-management (i.e., objective equality). ship between co-management and equity. A third limitation The presence of access restrictions was negatively related to is that our study assessed disparity measures based on per- subjective losses and positively related to objective losses. ceptions but not on quantitative objective indicators (e.g., The likelihood that fishers experience losses relative to other livelihood income and expenditure). Co-management can fishers (i.e., objective losses) may be increased because cer - result in disparities in material benefits which can further tain groups (e.g., clans) within the community may hold harm marginalized groups and may not be captured by dis- different access rights (Lau et al. 2021) and impact fishers’ parities measurements based on equity perceptions. There- livelihoods unevenly. In addition, access rights embedded fore, future studies could additionally measure disparities in in customary governance systems may be seen as legitimate material benefits and other non-perception-based indicators 1 3 Sustainability Science of wellbeing (Kaplan-Hallam and Bennett 2018) to provide These findings suggest that different strategies can be a more complete understanding of the disparities that exist implemented to promote or reduce the different kinds of dis- in a certain context. parities we examined (i.e., objective versus subjective dis- A fourth key limitation of our study is that we examined parities, and losses versus gains). However, there are two key distributional equality and not distributional equity. Distri- aspects to consider when implementing these strategies to butional equality involves distributing benefits and/or costs ensure equitable and effective management. First, it is critical equally among people. Although equality is often equated to unravel whether equality or different types of disparities are with equity, a fair distribution of benefits or costs can fol- considered equitable or fair by local s fi hers, because it is often low other distributions or principles. Indeed, social justice not equality that concerns people, but rather equity. Second, theory identifies three major distributional justice principles: given that disparities can have consequences for other social need, equality, and proportionality (Deutsch 1975). Which of and ecological aspects of the system, it is critical to understand these principles is considered fair can vary according to the the trade-offs of managing disparities. For example, our study situation at hand, including the socio-cultural context and suggests that improving market access for small-scale fish- the nature of the benefit (Martin et al. 2019; Gurney et al. ers may promote equality and reduce losses. However, market 2021). For example, in Fiji, distributing material benefits engagement can pose risks to small-scale fisheries, e.g., it can arising from a co-managed marine protected area according lead to overexploitation (Cinner et al. 2016), a reduction in to customary rights (a proportionality distributional justice preferences for distributional equality (Gurney et al. 2021), or principle) was perceived as fairer than distributing benefits may crowd out critical aspects of pro-environmental behavior equally, according to need, or proportionally to opportunity (Cinner et al. 2021), including willingness to engage in col- costs associated with displaced fishing effort (Gurney et al. lective action (Gurney et al. 2016). 2021). Equity or fairness is a powerful human motivator, and Supplementary Information The online version contains supplemen- it has a strong influence on feelings and behaviors. Given it tary material available at https://doi. or g/10. 1007/ s11625- 023- 01361-w . is often equity and fairness, rather than equality, that people care about and which, therefore, influences behavior (Star - Acknowledgements We thank the communities and leaders for their time and willingness to participate in this research. We acknowledge mans et al. 2017), research is needed to evaluate if the dis- support from the Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for parities we identified are perceived as fair or not. In addition, Coral Reef Studies, James Cook University. This work was supported future studies could assess whether the socioeconomic and by grants from the Australian Research Council, including through a Centre of Excellence Grant (CE140100020), Future Fellowship Grant institutional characteristics included in this study are also to J.C. (FT160100047), and Discovery Early Career Research Fellow- related to equity perceptions. ship Grants to G.G.G. (DE210101918) and M.L.B. (DE190101583). SG acknowledges ANID/PIA BASAL FB0002, ANID—Millen- nium Science Initiative Program—ICN 2019_015, and FONDECYT 1230982. We acknowledge Melanie A. Hamel for her contribution to Conclusion the initial data analysis and the initial data collectors Andrew Wamu- kota, Narriman Jiddawi, Ando Rabearisoa, Rachel Lahari and John Co-management has positive and negative impacts on Kuange. people’s livelihoods which are often unevenly distributed. Author contributions CRC: conceptualization, analysis, writing— These disparities or uneven distributions of co-management original draft preparation, writing, reviewing, and editing. GGG: con- impacts have both ethical and instrumental implications for ceptualization, writing, reviewing, editing, and supervision. MLB: con- environmental management. Therefore, understanding what ceptualization, methodology, analysis, writing, reviewing, and editing. co-management disparities exist and the conditions under SG: writing, reviewing and editing. JEC: conceptualization, resources, methodology, analysis, writing, reviewing, editing and supervision. All which disparities are likely to occur is critical for promoting the authors reviewed have approved the final version. equitable and effective management. Here, we provide some of the first evidence on how disparities are experienced in Funding Open Access funding enabled and organized by CAUL and objective and subjective terms, and how they are related to its Member Institutions. key socioeconomic and institutional characteristics. In our Data accessibility statement The data has been deposited on Research analysis of 1191 fishers across 48 co-management arrange- Data JCU and it is available at https://doi. or g/10. 25903/ ypbj- zf68 . The ments in five Indo-Pacific countries, we found that objective code can be accessed at https:// git hub. c om/ cr is t ina r u a noch amor r o/ and subjective equality were more prevalent than disparities Ruano Chamo rroet al_ 2023_ Dispa rity_ Coman ageme nt. (losses and gains), and it was more common for a fisher to perceive losses than gains. We also found that disparities Declarations were related to a variety of socioeconomic (e.g., distance Conflict of interest We declare no conflict of interest with this work. to markets, population size, and wealth) and institutional (e.g., area restrictions and conflict resolution mechanisms) Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons characteristics. 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Disparities in the impacts of co-management on fishers’ livelihoods

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Abstract

Natural resources are widely managed through collaborative governance arrangements (e.g., co-management) which often result in the uneven distribution of costs and benefits among fishers. Discrepancies in how a fisher is impacted by co-man- agement relative to other fishers or others in the community (i.e., disparity) can negatively affect fishers’ wellbeing, their support for management, and subsequently, ecological outcomes. Yet, disparities in the distribution of social impacts from co-management have rarely been assessed. We address this gap by examining disparities (losses and gains) in perceived liveli- hood impacts from co-management. Losses (or gains) occur when a fisher experiences a more negative (or positive) impact on their livelihood relative to other s fi hers or others in the community. We used data from interviews with 1191 s fi hers associated with 48 coral reef co-management arrangements across Kenya, Tanzania, Madagascar, Indonesia, and Papua New Guinea to examine how socioeconomic and institutional characteristics were associated with losses and gains from co-management. Overall, we found that more fishers perceived equality than disparities in the distribution of co-management impacts. Of those that perceived disparities, more fishers perceived losses than gains. We also found that disparities could be predicted by a range of socioeconomic characteristics, including distance to markets and wealth, and institutional characteristics of the co-management regime, such as gear, access, and area restrictions. This study provides insights on potential entry points that could be used by managers and policy-makers to promote equitable co-management of small-scale fisheries, such as the reduction of losses by increasing participation in decision-making processes, fostering conflict resolution mechanisms, prioritizing gear restrictions over area restrictions, and reducing poverty. Keywords Inequality · Equity · Fisheries livelihoods · Socioeconomic impacts · Institutional design principles · Natural resource management Introduction is intended to be a collaborative and participatory process often involving communities, governments, civil society, Common-pool resources across the world—including for- and research institutions (Berkes 2009), and aims to pro- ests, fisheries, and pastures—are commonly governed under vide a degree of decision-making power to people who are co-management governance arrangements (Berkes 2009; affected by management decisions. By facilitating the incor - Oldekop et al. 2016; Gelcich et al. 2019). Co-management poration of local values, needs, governance, and priorities, co-management is thought to lead to better outcomes for local people than more centralized governance approaches Handled by Patrik J. G. Henriksson, Stockholm Resilience (Berkes 2009). Studies suggest that co-management can lead Centre, Sweden. to both positive outcomes such as increased participation * Cristina Ruano-Chamorro and empowerment (d’Armengol et al. 2018; Oldekop et al. cristina.ruanochamorro@my.jcu.edu.au 2016; Yang and Pomeroy 2017) and negative outcomes such as inequalities including unequal access to decision-making College of Arts, Society and Education, James Cook (Bene et al. 2009) and uneven distribution of costs and ben- University, Douglas, QLD, Australia efits among local people (Cinner et al. 2014; Gurney et al. Instituto Milenio en Socio-Ecología Costera (SECOS), 2015; Ward et al. 2018). However, a clear understanding Santiago, Chile of how positive and negative impacts are experienced and Center of Applied Ecology and Sustainability, Facultad de Ciencias Biológicas, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago, Chile Vol.:(0123456789) 1 3 Sustainability Science perceived by the diverse members within communities is still lacking (Quimby and Levine 2018; Gibbes and Keys 2010). Discrepancies on how an individual is impacted relative to others in the community (i.e., disparities) have important implications for social and ecological outcomes (Pascual et  al. 2014; Hamann et al. 2018). When co-management costs fall on those who are most deprived, disparities can further harm the most vulnerable people, increasing pov- erty and deepening social inequalities (Adams et al. 2004; Persha and Andersson 2014). Perceived disparities can influ- ence peoples’ attitudes and their willingness to engage with management initiatives (Fabinyi et al. 2015; Hamann et al. 2018). In particular, if disparities are considered unfair, management support and cooperation can be undermined, leading to social conflicts and non-compliance (Gurney et al. 2014), and ultimately, to hampering management success (Loomis and Ditton 1993; Pascual et al. 2014; Fabinyi et al. 2015). Indeed, scholarship on distributional equity from Fig. 1 Map with co-management sites in a Kenya and Tanzania, b Madagascar, c Indonesia, and d Papua New Guinea. Approximate psychology suggests that preferences for equitable distribu- locations of co-management sites are indicated with red dots tions are rooted in neurological and psychological processes, and are strongly related to attitudes, beliefs and behavior, including legitimacy and collective action (Dawes et  al. According to the theory of relative deprivation, the per- 2007; Nishi et al. 2015; Tyler 2015). Importantly, subjective ception of being a loser can negatively affect people’s well- wellbeing has been shown to be strongly related to percep- being (Crosby 1976; Smith et al. 2012). Therefore, in the tions of (un)fair disparities (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009; context of co-management, promoting perceptions of not Prilleltensky 2012). being a loser may be important for promoting subjective Given the implications of distributional inequity on the wellbeing, and support for management. In addition, under- social and ecological outcomes of co-management, dispari- standing the social conditions associated with disparities in ties in socioeconomic impacts are a key consideration for co-management outcomes is essential to informing targeted co-management decision-makers. Depending on the context, policies and practices that account for equity issues. decision-makers may be interested in promoting equality or Despite the importance of understanding disparities in even certain types of disparities. For instance, management co-management, it remains unclear the degree to which co- strategies may be focused on promoting winners without management leads to disparities (i.e., objective disparity), increasing losers (i.e., making people better off without mak - the degree to which disparities are perceived (i.e., subjective ing anyone worse off) (Pareto 1906). In addition, strategies disparity), and what socioeconomic and institutional charac- may be focused on managing subjective or perceived dispar- teristics are related to these disparities. Indeed, the literature ities, which are considered a stronger predictor of individual on inequality and environmental management has largely and social outcomes than objective measures of disparity focused on economic inequality (i.e., wealth or income) and (Nishi et al. 2015; Hauser and Norton 2017; Starmans et al. its role as a driver of outcomes (Baland et al. 2007; Persha 2017). and Andersson 2014; Hamann et al. 2018), and on differ - ential impacts among occupational or social groups (e.g., gender and religion) (Gurney et al. 2015; Ward et al. 2018; 1 Gill et al. 2019). Following McClanahan et al. 2012, we use disparity to refer to dis- crepancies in perceived benefits (and/or costs) between an individual In this paper, we build on this existing work by quanti- fisher and other fishers or the community more generally. The dis- fying how specific socioeconomic and institutional charac- parity metric in our analysis is measure of the distribution of liveli- teristics relate to two types of disparities (subjective and hood impacts from co-management and has three categories: losses, objective) in livelihood impacts from coral reef co-manage- equality, and gains. Equality and equity are often used interchange- ably in the literature, yet they are distinct concepts (McDermott et al. ment for 1191 fishers across 48 co-management arrange- 2013). Equality refers to the equal distribution of benefits and/or costs ments in five Indo-Pacific countries (Figs.  1, 2). We used among individuals or groups (i.e., the absence of disparity), and is household surveys to elicit two forms of disparity based on one potential distribution that could be considered equitable. Distri- five-point Likert-type rating scale about the impacts of co- butional equity refers to the fair distribution of benefits and/or costs among individuals or groups (McDermott et al. 2013). management on: (1) the respondent’s livelihood and (2) the 1 3 Sustainability Science (approval number H3020). Prior informed oral consent from participants was obtained. Written consent was not obtained due to low literacy rates. Disparity metric (response variables) We asked fishers to indicate: (1) the degree to which they perceived co-management had a positive, neutral, or nega- tive impact on their livelihoods (individual impact). Liveli- hood was conceptualized and explained as a broad concept of wellbeing (not solely referring to employment) (Allison and Ellis 2001); and (2) the degree to which they perceived co-management had a positive, neutral, negative impact on the broader community (community impact). Both responses were on a 5-point Likert-type scale, 1 being very negative impact on livelihoods, 5 very positive impact, and 3 being Fig. 2 Subjective and objective disparity metrics in our study. Sub- neither positive nor negative. From these questions, we cre- jective disparity refers to the level of impact that an individual fisher ated two metrics of disparity, which we refer to as subjective perceived to receive from co-management, minus the impact that and objective disparity (Fig. 2): individual fisher perceived the community receives. Objective dispar - ity refers to the level of impact that an individual fisher respondent Subjective disparity was calculated by subtracting a perceived to receive from co-management, minus the average of the impact perceived by all sampled fishers in the community. Each dis- respondent’s score for community impact from their parity metric was broken down into three categories: (a) losses (sub- score for individual impact. Subjective disparity thus jective disparity < 0; objective disparity < −  0.5); (b) equality (sub- captures whether the respondent self-identifies as a jective disparity = 0; objective disparity ≥ −  0.5 and ≤ 0.5); (c) gains winner or loser (i.e., perceived relative position of the (subjective gain > 0; objective gain > 0.5) individual within the community), which may affect their perceptions, attitudes, and behavior (e.g., relative wider community (Fig. 2). These surveys were also used in deprivation) (Crosby 1976). combination with key informant interviews to examine 17 Objective disparity was calculated by subtracting socioeconomic and institutional conditions expected to be the community’s mean individual impact from each related to co-management outcomes. respondents’ individual impact score. Objective dis- parity is thus the relative position of the respondent among sampled fishers (i.e., level of impact a fisher Materials and methods perceives to have received relative to other fishers in their community). Although it may not necessar- Study sites and sampling approach ily be perceived by respondents, research has shown that objective disparity matters for people’s wellbeing We studied 48 independent coral reef fisheries co-manage- (Townsend 1987; Wilkinson and Pickett 2009). The ment arrangements spanning five Indo-Pacific countries: uneven allocation of costs and benefits may increase Kenya, Tanzania, Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, and Mada- existing inequalities and levels of poverty and lead to gascar (Fig. 1) (Cinner et al. 2012). We used purposive sam- social conflict and a wide range of governance prob- pling to ensure variation in our predictor variables (i.e., dif- lems (Persha and Andersson 2014). ferent levels of market integration and population). To gather information and triangulate results in each study site, we Thus, our subjective metric considers how a fisher thinks employed a combination of household surveys, semi-struc- the community benefits, while the objective measure inte- tured interviews with community leaders, co-management grates perceptions of sampled fishers (Fig.  2). We broke organization leaders, and other key informants (knowledge- down subjective and objective disparity metrics into three able fishers, elders, and other stakeholders), and analyses of categories each (losses, equality, gains). Values equal to zero secondary sources such as population censuses. In total, we (or between 0.5 and − 0.5 in the case of objective dispar- conducted 1191 resource user interviews, 53 key informant ity metric) were categorized as equality, values below zero interviews, 54 community leader interviews, and 51 organi- (or below 0.5) were categorized as losses, and values above zational leader interviews. This study was part of a project zero (or 0.5) were categorized as gains. Losses occur when focused on household heads, who were mostly men. This a fisher experiences a more negative impact relative to the research was approved by the JCU Human Ethics Committee rest of the community (or fishers in the case of objective 1 3 Sustainability Science disparity), gains occur when a fisher experiences a more right and fair (Ruano-Chamorro et al. 2022). At the commu- positive impact relative to the rest of the community (or fish- nity level, proximity to markets may positively impact local ers), while equality occurs when a fisher experiences same livelihoods by providing access to resources and economic impacts relative to the rest of the community (or fishers). opportunities (Bene et al. 2010), although it may crowd out Hence, we obtained four response variables, which related to intrinsic incentives (Cinner et al. 2021). In addition, large whether fisher experienced or perceived an equality outcome population size can diminish or enhance collective action versus an: (1) objective gain; (2) objective loss; (3) subjec- (Poteete and Ostrom 2004) and thus the delivery of equitable tive gain; and (4) subjective loss. For example, a subjective livelihood outcomes to local communities. gain would be when a fisher perceives that he or she benefits We examined seven key characteristics that were more than he or she perceives the community benefits. An informed by Ostrom’s eight design principles for devolved objective gain refers to when a fisher’s perception of the commons management (Ostrom 1990). Institutional char- impact to their livelihood is higher than the average of all acteristics are key to understanding the likelihood of col- sampled fishers’ perceptions from that community. lective action and, thus, the possibility of achieving eco- logical and social benefits (Ostrom 1990) and can influence Socioeconomic and institutional characteristics how users receive and perceive benefits and costs (Cinner (predictor variables) et al. 2012). Clear defined boundaries and operational rules can exclude certain people or social groups, negatively We examined the relationship between disparities and 17 impacting their livelihoods while benefiting others, leading socioeconomic and institutional characteristics, which were to unequal distribution of impacts in the community. The selected based on institutional analysis theory (Ostrom operational rules considered in this study include access 2009) and their relevance to this specific context according restrictions (i.e., restricted or prohibited access to fishing to co-management theory and research (Cinner et al. 2012; grounds to non-members), area restrictions (i.e., prohibi- Ward et al. 2018; Gurney et al. 2019; Epstein et al. 2021) (SI tion of fishing in certain areas) and gear restrictions (i.e., Appendix, Table S1). prohibition of certain gears). Participation in resource We examined eight individual-level and two community- management decision-making is key to achieve procedural level socioeconomic characteristics (SI Appendix, Table S1) equity (Ruano-Chamorro et al. 2022) and good governance which can influence whether people engage in collective (Lockwood 2010). Specifically, active participation of local resource management (Ostrom 2009; Ward et  al. 2018; users in decision-making processes can promote procedural Epstein et al. 2021) and how cost and benefits are distrib- fairness (Ruano-Chamorro et al. 2022) and, thus, equita- uted (Gurney et al. 2015; Gill et al. 2019). Socioeconomic ble distribution of outcomes. Graduated sanctions promote characteristics, such as gender, migrant status, wealth, and compliance by punishing severe or repeated rule violations education, shape hierarchical structures that privilege cer- (Ostrom 1990) and can increase the likelihood of obtain- tain individuals (e.g., wealthy and highly educated people) ing both benefits and costs from co-management (Cinner while marginalizing others (e.g., women and migrant) who et al. 2012), while the presence of effective mechanisms to are often excluded from decision-making processes and solve conflicts in co-management arrangements is essential bear the costs of management (Persha and Andersson 2014; to promote equity (Gurney et al. 2019; Ruano-Chamorro McClanahan and Abunge 2016; Gustavsson et al. 2021). In et al. 2022). A more detailed description of institutional and addition, participation in community events can increase socioeconomic characteristics that can influence social out- social capital and promote management equity (Diedrich comes in co-management arrangements is provided in SI et al. 2017), but also exacerbate inequalities as those indi- Appendix, Table S1. viduals with more connections may have more ability to inu fl ence decisions and benet fi from co-management (Smith Analyses 2012). Fishery dependency, operationalized here as primary marine livelihood and occupational diversity, can also influ- We conducted four mixed effect binomial logistic regres- ence how fishers benefit from co-management (Cinner et al. sion models, including site as random effect, to quan- 2012; Aaron MacNeil and Cinner 2013). For instance, highly tify the relationship between the predictor variables and dependent fishers may be more vulnerable to restrictions the likelihood of an equality outcome vs subjective loss than those with lower dependency and experience higher (model 1), subjective gains (model 2), objective losses negative impacts from co-management (McClanahan et al. (model 3), and objective gains (model 4). For example, in 2009). Finally, trust in leaders may influence perceived ben- model 1, we examined what differentiates those experienc- efits and disparity because fishers who trust leaders may ing subjective losses from those experiencing subjective perceive that management is effective (Jones et al. 2017) and equality. Similarly, in model 2, we examined what differ - that leaders take into account their interests and do what is entiates those experiencing subjective gains from those 1 3 Sustainability Science Objective Objective Objective Loss Equality Gain Subjective Loss Subjective Equality Fig. 3 Distribution of subjective and objective disparity metrics. A Percent of individual fishers who perceived more negative impacts from co-management relative to the community (red); the same impacts than the community (grey); and more positive impacts than the community (blue). B Percent of individual fishers who perceived more negative impacts from co-management relative to sampled fish- Subjec ve ers (red); the same impacts relative to sampled fishers (black); and Gain more positive impacts relative to sampled fishers (red) Pearson residuals: experiencing subjective equality, and so on. We followed p-value = an information theoretic approach to model selection < 2.22e-16 (Grueber et al. 2011) (SI Appendix). -6.9-4.0 -2.00.0 2.0 4.08.7 Fig. 4 Mosaic plot and percentage of fishers experiencing combina- tions of objective and subjective disparity categories (losses, equal- ity, gains). The widths of the columns indicate the percentage of the Results number of observations in each objective disparity category, and the widths of the rows indicate the percentage of the number of obser- Equality was the most frequent category of the objective and vations in each subjective disparity category (e.g., 56% of fishers subjective disparity metric (i.e., losses, equality, and gains) experienced both objective and subjective losses, and 78% of fishers who experienced objective gains perceived subjective equality). Chi- and comprised the majority of outcomes in our subjective, square test and Pearson residuals are shown. Blue indicates that the but not our objective metric (Fig. 3). In other words, fishers observed value is higher than expected than if the data were random; generally perceived more equality (i.e., fishers felt they were red indicates that the observed value is lower than expected than if benefiting the same as the rest of the community) than what the data were random was measured in more objective terms (Fig.  3). The fre- quency of objective losses and gains was similar (Fig. 3B), while the frequency for subjective losses was higher than the Relationships between institutional frequency of subjective gains (Fig. 3A), meaning that fishers and socioeconomic characteristics and disparities were more likely to see themselves as losers than as winners relative to sampled fishers. We used four binomial mixed-effects models to examine Although objective and subjective disparities were how the likelihood of an equality response versus each of related (Chi square = 178.59, df = 4, p value < 2.22 e−16), the four different types of losses and gains were related to there were substantial variations in fishers’ objective com- seven institutional and 10 socioeconomic characteristics (SI pared to their subjective disparity (Fig.  4). Many fishers Appendix, Table S1) that have been previously shown to perceived subjective equality when experiencing objective be important in shaping co-management outcomes (Ostrom gains (n = 203) and objective losses (n = 102) (Fig. 4). Fur- 2009; Cinner et al. 2012; Ward et al. 2018; Gurney et al. thermore, it was more common for a fisher to perceive sub- 2019; Epstein et al. 2021). We found four socioeconomic jective losses when they experienced objective losses than characteristics and five institutional characteristics were sig- for a fisher to perceive subjective gains when experienc- nificantly related to disparities (Fig.  5). We also found that ing objective gains (i.e., 56% of the fishers experimenting overall, losses were more likely to be influenced by these objective losses perceived subjective losses, while only 16% characteristics as opposed to gains. of fishers experiencing objective gains perceived objective Socioeconomic characteristics were related to three of our gains) (Fig. 4). response variables (subjective losses, subjective gains, and 1 3 % Individuals Sustainability Science Fig. 5 Relationship between socioeconomic and institutional char- included as a random effect in the models. Error bars indicate 95% acteristics and subjective and objective disparity metrics. Relation- confidence interval. Effect sizes have been standardized by subtract- ships are indicated with the model-averaged standardized coefficient ing their mean and dividing by two times their standard deviation estimates of binomial logistic mixed effect models. Community is objective losses). Population size and participation in com- were more likely to experience negative impacts from munity events were the only socioeconomic characteristics access restrictions than other fishers in objective terms. related to both subjective and objective disparity (Fig. 5). In In contrast, fishers in communities with area restrictions communities with large population size, fishers were more were more likely to see themselves as losers, while in com- likely to see themselves as winners and losers relative to the munities with gear restrictions, fishers were less likely to rest of the community (i.e., experience subjective losses and experience objective losses relative to other fishers. Two gains), and were less likely to experience objective losses. additional institutional characteristics were related to dif- Fishers who participated in community events were more ferent types of disparities. Participation in the decision- likely to experience subjective gains and subjective losses, making process was negatively related to objective losses and more likely to experience objective losses. Wealth was (Fig. 5), suggesting that higher levels of participation in both negatively related to subjective losses and gains, and decision-making reduces objective losses (or promotes thus, wealthier fishers were less likely to perceive disparities equality). Finally, the presence of effective conflict reso- (both losses and gains). In addition, distance to markets was lution mechanisms was negatively related to subjective positively related to subjective losses. In other words, fishers losses (Fig. 5). living in communities with lower market access (i.e., farther from markets) were more likely to see themselves as losers. Institutional characteristics were related to two of our response variables (subjective losses and objective losses) Discussion (Fig. 5). Rules relating to access, gear, and area restric- tions had a different relationship with the two types of Together, our study revealed three key results with impor- disparities. Specifically, fishers in sites with access restric- tant implications for co-management. First, fishers can tions were less likely to perceive subjective losses but overestimate equal outcomes, and when they do perceive more likely to experience objective losses; fishers in sites disparities, losses are more likely to be perceived than with area restrictions were more likely to perceive sub- gains. Second, losses and gains were related to distinct jective losses, while fishers in sites with gear restrictions socioeconomic and institutional characteristics, with some were less likely to experience objective losses (Fig. 5). In characteristics related to only losses, and others to both other words, fishers affected by access restrictions were gains and losses. Our third key result is that socioeco- more likely to perceive being equally impacted by co- nomic and institutional characteristics tend to be related management relative to the community, although fishers to subjective or objective disparity. 1 3 Sustainability Science could then be targeted with additional support. In addi- Subjective and objective disparity tion, if further investigations reveal that the relationships between these socioeconomic and institutional characteris- Fishers perceived higher levels of equality (i.e., subjective equality) than indicated by the objective disparity meas- tics are causal, these characteristics could be used as levers for change. ure (i.e., objective equality). In other words, fishers may be perceiving that everyone in the community is similarly Losses were less likely to occur where there was par- ticipation in decision-making, conflict resolution mecha- impacted by co-management, even though co-management actually impacts some fishers more than others. Other stud- nisms, gear restrictions, absence of area restrictions, and in communities near markets. Participation in decision- ies have shown that co-management can be perceived as acceptable and fair even when it impacts some groups (e.g., making and effective conflict resolution mechanisms have been shown to promote perceptions of procedural equity women) more negatively than others (Kleiber et al. 2018; Lau et al. 2021). This may be because fishers perceive the (i.e., fair decision-making process) (Ruano-Chamorro et al. 2022), which in turn can lead to perceptions of distributional decision-making process of their respective co-manage- ment arrangements as fair, which may lead to perceptions equity. Gear restrictions in this context may reduce objective losses because coral reef fishers often use multiple gears, of equity or equality in co-management impacts (Gustavs- son et al. 2021) regardless of the actual distribution (Tyler or alternatively gear restrictions may be viewed as a means to reduce competition from fishers using other gears. As a 2015). In cases where disparities were perceived, we found that fishers perceived more than twice as many losses than result, fishers may be less vulnerable to gear restrictions than to other restrictions, such as area restrictions. Consistent gains. This result may be indicative of the concept of loss aversion, which refers to the cognitive bias that people have with our results, other studies have found that fishers often have more positive perceptions of gear than area restric- towards perceiving that losses hurt twice as much as the satisfaction of an equivalent gain (Kahneman and Tversky tions (McClanahan et al. 2012; Barley Kincaid et al. 2014; McClanahan and Abunge 2016). 1979). Indeed, we found that fishers perceived more sub- jective losses when they experienced objective losses com- Our finding that perceived losses were less likely in com- munities close to markets could be due to a number of mech- pared to their perception of subjective gains when they were experiencing objective gains. If they perceive these losses anisms. Market proximity may reduce dependency on mid- dlemen, potentially leading to higher bargaining power and as unfair, fishers may be experiencing relative deprivation (Crosby 1976; Smith et  al. 2012). This feeling of being earnings (Maire et al. 2020; Rojas et al. 2021). Alternatively, the relationship between market proximity and perceived worse off than others can lead to frustration, anxiety, dissat- isfaction, anger, or resentment and promote social conflicts, losses could be due to an increase in fishers’ preferences for equality. Indeed, research from human evolutionary biol- distrust, and anti-social behavior (Crosby 1976; Wilkinson and Pickett 2009; Smith et al. 2012). In a co-management ogy suggests that market integration gives rise to prosocial norms, including a preference for distributional equality, context, relative deprivation may lead to unethical and inef- ficient management interventions because it can negatively which can facilitate mutually beneficial exchanges among strangers who do not have established social relationships affect people’s wellbeing, reduce support for co-manage - ment (Gelcich et al. 2007; Wangel and Blomkvist 2013), and (e.g., kinship and reciprocity) (Henrich et al. 2010). Con- versely, other studies have found that market engagement ultimately lead to management failure. For instance, fishers in Texas felt relative deprivation because fishing regula - can reduce preferences for equal or pro-poor distribution of conservation benefits (Martin et al. 2019; Cinner et al. 2021; tions only affected them and not fishers who fish in other bays, which caused opposition towards fishing regulations Gurney et al. 2021) and lead to an unequal distribution of market benefits among fishers (Ferguson 2021). Indeed, the (Loomis and Ditton 1993). influence of markets on human preferences and behavior and, thus, conservation and management outcomes contin- How socioeconomic and institutional characteristics are related to disparities: losses and gains ues to be debated (Maire et al. 2020; Cinner et al. 2021). It is likely that the relationship is complex, being dependent Our second key finding is that losses and gains were related on the social-ecological context, and potentially non-linear (Epstein et al. 2021). to distinct socioeconomic and institutional characteristics, with some characteristics more likely to be related to only Both gains and losses were more likely to be experienced and/or perceived when fishers were poorer, more involved in losses (e.g., distance to markets, gear and area restrictions), and others more likely to be related to both gains and losses community events, and lived in communities with a larger population. Previous research has also shown that poorer (e.g., population size and wealth). These findings can help identify individuals and contexts in which undesirable out- fishers are more likely to perceive both negative and posi- tive impacts (e.g., fisheries displacement and higher catch) comes of co-management are more likely to result, which 1 3 Sustainability Science from marine protected areas in Kenya (Cinner et al. 2014). (Osei-tutu et al. 2021) and lead to perceptions of equality One possible explanation is that poorer people are more vul- (i.e., low subjective losses). nerable (Cinner et al. 2009), which means that any change Therefore, the conditions related to a fisher receiving to their livelihoods has a greater impact than on wealthy more losses or gains than other fishers are not always the people. Further, concerns about scarcity can influence cogni- same conditions that relate to the same fisher seeing them- tive processes (Shah et al. 2018), leading people to be more selves as a loser or a winner relative to the community psychologically sensitive to the impacts (both positive and they belong to. In essence, socioeconomic and institutional negative) of co-management. With regard to the positive characteristics may have different influences on how fishers’ relationship we found between involvement in community livelihoods are affected relative to other fishers (i.e., objec- events and the experience of both gains and losses, increased tive disparity), and on how fishers’ livelihoods are affected connectedness through these events could be exacerbating relative to how fishers perceive the community to be affected disparities and benefiting certain groups over others, as well (i.e., subjective disparity). These findings provide entry as making disparities within the community more visible points for managing for either subjective or objective dis- (Ballet et  al. 2007; Cook 2014). Lastly, the relationship parities. For example, to foster objective equality, managers between population size and management outcomes is com- may promote participation in decision-making and imple- plex, context-dependent (Poteete and Ostrom 2004), may ment gear restrictions rather than access restrictions. Alter- be non-linear (Aaron MacNeil and Cinner 2013), interacts natively, while objective equality is likely a frequent goal in with other factors (Aaron MacNeil and Cinner 2013), and is co-management, promoting subjective equality or percep- generally unclear. Therefore, further examination is required tions of being a winner might be an equally valid goal given to better understand the mechanisms through which popula- the influence of fairness perceptions on attitudes, behaviors, tion size shapes co-management disparities. and wellbeing. Thus, our study provides guidance on the different strategies that could be implemented depending on How socioeconomic and institutional characteristics the outcome of interest. are related to disparities: objective and subjective Limitations and future research Our third key finding is that socioeconomic and institutional characteristics tend to relate to either subjective or objective Our study takes an important first step in evaluating dif - disparity, with just three characteristics associated with both ferent types of disparity in co-management, and exploring types of metrics. For instance, conflict resolution was only how these outcomes are related to key socioeconomic and related to subjective disparity and participation in decision- institutional characteristics, but has some limitations that making was only related to objective disparity. Conflict reso- could be addressed in future studies. First, while our study lution mechanisms may provide tangible ways of solving provides some evidence of the direction and magnitude of problems within the community and reduce fishers’ percep- the relationship between disparities and the examined socio- tions of being a loser. Members of a community in Papua economic and institutional characteristics, it is not designed New Guinea regularly engage in collective reasoning of what to establish whether those relationships are causal. Future is fair and unfair during meetings, which facilitates a shared research could assess the causal effect of potential drivers of perception of equity within the community (Lau et al. 2021). equity, such as those suggested in this study, through impact A similar process may occur through effective conflict reso- evaluation, which involves focusing on design over meth- lution mechanisms, thus reducing the likelihood that fishers ods and the use of counterfactuals (Ferraro and Hanauer perceive that they are being more negatively impacted than 2014). A second limitation is that this study does not com- other members of the community. On the other hand, fish- pare co-managed sites with ‘control’ sites that are not under ers involved in decision-making, and thus possibly able to co-management arrangements. Future studies could include satisfy their needs for procedural equity and self-determina- different management arrangements (e.g., co-management, tion (Decaro and Stokes 2013), may tend to perceive simi- open access, and state-led) to better understand the relation- lar impacts from co-management (i.e., objective equality). ship between co-management and equity. A third limitation The presence of access restrictions was negatively related to is that our study assessed disparity measures based on per- subjective losses and positively related to objective losses. ceptions but not on quantitative objective indicators (e.g., The likelihood that fishers experience losses relative to other livelihood income and expenditure). Co-management can fishers (i.e., objective losses) may be increased because cer - result in disparities in material benefits which can further tain groups (e.g., clans) within the community may hold harm marginalized groups and may not be captured by dis- different access rights (Lau et al. 2021) and impact fishers’ parities measurements based on equity perceptions. There- livelihoods unevenly. In addition, access rights embedded fore, future studies could additionally measure disparities in in customary governance systems may be seen as legitimate material benefits and other non-perception-based indicators 1 3 Sustainability Science of wellbeing (Kaplan-Hallam and Bennett 2018) to provide These findings suggest that different strategies can be a more complete understanding of the disparities that exist implemented to promote or reduce the different kinds of dis- in a certain context. parities we examined (i.e., objective versus subjective dis- A fourth key limitation of our study is that we examined parities, and losses versus gains). However, there are two key distributional equality and not distributional equity. Distri- aspects to consider when implementing these strategies to butional equality involves distributing benefits and/or costs ensure equitable and effective management. First, it is critical equally among people. Although equality is often equated to unravel whether equality or different types of disparities are with equity, a fair distribution of benefits or costs can fol- considered equitable or fair by local s fi hers, because it is often low other distributions or principles. Indeed, social justice not equality that concerns people, but rather equity. Second, theory identifies three major distributional justice principles: given that disparities can have consequences for other social need, equality, and proportionality (Deutsch 1975). Which of and ecological aspects of the system, it is critical to understand these principles is considered fair can vary according to the the trade-offs of managing disparities. For example, our study situation at hand, including the socio-cultural context and suggests that improving market access for small-scale fish- the nature of the benefit (Martin et al. 2019; Gurney et al. ers may promote equality and reduce losses. However, market 2021). For example, in Fiji, distributing material benefits engagement can pose risks to small-scale fisheries, e.g., it can arising from a co-managed marine protected area according lead to overexploitation (Cinner et al. 2016), a reduction in to customary rights (a proportionality distributional justice preferences for distributional equality (Gurney et al. 2021), or principle) was perceived as fairer than distributing benefits may crowd out critical aspects of pro-environmental behavior equally, according to need, or proportionally to opportunity (Cinner et al. 2021), including willingness to engage in col- costs associated with displaced fishing effort (Gurney et al. lective action (Gurney et al. 2016). 2021). Equity or fairness is a powerful human motivator, and Supplementary Information The online version contains supplemen- it has a strong influence on feelings and behaviors. Given it tary material available at https://doi. or g/10. 1007/ s11625- 023- 01361-w . is often equity and fairness, rather than equality, that people care about and which, therefore, influences behavior (Star - Acknowledgements We thank the communities and leaders for their time and willingness to participate in this research. We acknowledge mans et al. 2017), research is needed to evaluate if the dis- support from the Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for parities we identified are perceived as fair or not. In addition, Coral Reef Studies, James Cook University. This work was supported future studies could assess whether the socioeconomic and by grants from the Australian Research Council, including through a Centre of Excellence Grant (CE140100020), Future Fellowship Grant institutional characteristics included in this study are also to J.C. (FT160100047), and Discovery Early Career Research Fellow- related to equity perceptions. ship Grants to G.G.G. (DE210101918) and M.L.B. (DE190101583). SG acknowledges ANID/PIA BASAL FB0002, ANID—Millen- nium Science Initiative Program—ICN 2019_015, and FONDECYT 1230982. We acknowledge Melanie A. Hamel for her contribution to Conclusion the initial data analysis and the initial data collectors Andrew Wamu- kota, Narriman Jiddawi, Ando Rabearisoa, Rachel Lahari and John Co-management has positive and negative impacts on Kuange. people’s livelihoods which are often unevenly distributed. Author contributions CRC: conceptualization, analysis, writing— These disparities or uneven distributions of co-management original draft preparation, writing, reviewing, and editing. GGG: con- impacts have both ethical and instrumental implications for ceptualization, writing, reviewing, editing, and supervision. MLB: con- environmental management. Therefore, understanding what ceptualization, methodology, analysis, writing, reviewing, and editing. co-management disparities exist and the conditions under SG: writing, reviewing and editing. JEC: conceptualization, resources, methodology, analysis, writing, reviewing, editing and supervision. All which disparities are likely to occur is critical for promoting the authors reviewed have approved the final version. equitable and effective management. Here, we provide some of the first evidence on how disparities are experienced in Funding Open Access funding enabled and organized by CAUL and objective and subjective terms, and how they are related to its Member Institutions. key socioeconomic and institutional characteristics. In our Data accessibility statement The data has been deposited on Research analysis of 1191 fishers across 48 co-management arrange- Data JCU and it is available at https://doi. or g/10. 25903/ ypbj- zf68 . The ments in five Indo-Pacific countries, we found that objective code can be accessed at https:// git hub. c om/ cr is t ina r u a noch amor r o/ and subjective equality were more prevalent than disparities Ruano Chamo rroet al_ 2023_ Dispa rity_ Coman ageme nt. (losses and gains), and it was more common for a fisher to perceive losses than gains. We also found that disparities Declarations were related to a variety of socioeconomic (e.g., distance Conflict of interest We declare no conflict of interest with this work. to markets, population size, and wealth) and institutional (e.g., area restrictions and conflict resolution mechanisms) Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons characteristics. 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Journal

Sustainability Science – Springer Journals

Published: Nov 1, 2023

Keywords: Inequality; Equity; Fisheries livelihoods; Socioeconomic impacts; Institutional design principles; Natural resource management

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