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Does board interlock affect CEO compensation? Evidence from companies listed in the Brazilian stock exchange

Does board interlock affect CEO compensation? Evidence from companies listed in the Brazilian... This study investigates the effects of board interlock on CEO compensation. We use an ordinary least square (OLS) for panel data approach and Social Network Analysis (SNA) procedures on a sample of 275 companies listed on the Brazilian stock exchange (B3), from 2011 to 2018, to evaluate the effects of board interlocks frameworks and some peculiarities of the Brazilian market on CEO compensation. Our empirical findings are twofold. First, our results indicate that the higher the board interlock level, the higher CEO compensation in the companies covered by our study. Second, the interlocks within business groups in the Brazilian market did not act as a moderator in the relationship between board interlock and CEO compensation, which indicates that the interlocks formed between companies listed on B3 are mostly between companies from different businesses groups. Overall, our study supports the perspectives of the agency and managerial power theories regarding the board of directors' role in setting the CEO compensation package and the issues that can influence this duty. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png International Journal of Disclosure and Governance Springer Journals

Does board interlock affect CEO compensation? Evidence from companies listed in the Brazilian stock exchange

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References (101)

Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Limited 2022. Springer Nature or its licensor holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.
ISSN
1741-3591
eISSN
1746-6539
DOI
10.1057/s41310-022-00159-z
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

This study investigates the effects of board interlock on CEO compensation. We use an ordinary least square (OLS) for panel data approach and Social Network Analysis (SNA) procedures on a sample of 275 companies listed on the Brazilian stock exchange (B3), from 2011 to 2018, to evaluate the effects of board interlocks frameworks and some peculiarities of the Brazilian market on CEO compensation. Our empirical findings are twofold. First, our results indicate that the higher the board interlock level, the higher CEO compensation in the companies covered by our study. Second, the interlocks within business groups in the Brazilian market did not act as a moderator in the relationship between board interlock and CEO compensation, which indicates that the interlocks formed between companies listed on B3 are mostly between companies from different businesses groups. Overall, our study supports the perspectives of the agency and managerial power theories regarding the board of directors' role in setting the CEO compensation package and the issues that can influence this duty.

Journal

International Journal of Disclosure and GovernanceSpringer Journals

Published: Dec 1, 2022

Keywords: CEO compensation; Board interlock; Board of directors; Business groups

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