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Evaluating vertical mergers: A post-chicago approach
- Publisher
- Springer Journals
- Copyright
- Copyright © 2013 by Springer Science+Business Media New York
- Subject
- Economics / Management Science; Industrial Organization; Economic Policy; R & D/Technology Policy; Microeconomics; European Integration
- ISSN
- 1566-1679
- eISSN
- 1573-7012
- DOI
- 10.1007/s10842-012-0150-9
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
This paper analyzes the impact of vertical integration on the static and dynamic stability of downstream incomplete collusion. It is shown that a vertical merger between an upstream firm and a downstream cartel or fringe firm promotes downstream collusion, under certain conditions on the market size. However, for low downstream market concentration, a vertical merger with a cartel firm hinders collusion. Moreover, a welfare analysis shows that consumer surplus increases with the vertical merger because the merger partially eliminates the double marginalization problem.
Journal
"Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade" – Springer Journals
Published: Feb 3, 2013