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Dynamic Games for Network SecurityDynamic Security Games with Incomplete Information

Dynamic Games for Network Security: Dynamic Security Games with Incomplete Information [In this chapter, we continue our exploration of dynamic security games with information asymmetry. As compared to the previous chapter, the discussions in this chapter focus on the complementary scenarios where the defender lacks information about the ongoing security competitions. Such scenarios exist in many practical security problems. The framework of Bayesian SG will be employed in this chapter to model and analyze such incomplete information dynamic security problems. Accordingly, a new algorithm, termed Bayesian Nash-Q, that allows the defender to infer the missing information based on repeated interactions with the attacker and the dynamic environment will be presented. This algorithm is a natural combination of the conventional repeated Bayesian games and the Nash-Q algorithm. For this reason, our discussion starts from reviewing some elementary concepts of Bayesian games, and then the Bayesian SG model and the Bayesian Nash-Q algorithm will be discussed in details.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

Dynamic Games for Network SecurityDynamic Security Games with Incomplete Information

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Publisher
Springer International Publishing
Copyright
© The Author(s) 2018
ISBN
978-3-319-75870-1
Pages
43 –60
DOI
10.1007/978-3-319-75871-8_4
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[In this chapter, we continue our exploration of dynamic security games with information asymmetry. As compared to the previous chapter, the discussions in this chapter focus on the complementary scenarios where the defender lacks information about the ongoing security competitions. Such scenarios exist in many practical security problems. The framework of Bayesian SG will be employed in this chapter to model and analyze such incomplete information dynamic security problems. Accordingly, a new algorithm, termed Bayesian Nash-Q, that allows the defender to infer the missing information based on repeated interactions with the attacker and the dynamic environment will be presented. This algorithm is a natural combination of the conventional repeated Bayesian games and the Nash-Q algorithm. For this reason, our discussion starts from reviewing some elementary concepts of Bayesian games, and then the Bayesian SG model and the Bayesian Nash-Q algorithm will be discussed in details.]

Published: Mar 1, 2018

Keywords: Practical Security Problems; Bayesian Game; Uninformed Player; Belief Vector; Timeslot

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