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[Two developments of Hempel’s theory of explanation are discussed in this chapter, unification in the vein of Friedman, and theoretical reduction in the vein of Nagel. The problems in Friedman’s theory of unification are traced to its purely syntactical analysis. By contrast, Nagel’s account of theory reduction contains from the very outset non-formal aspects, which gives room for an account of how theory relates to the world, i.e., for an account of non-formal semantics. So a successful reduction in Nagel’s sense may be viewed as ontological reduction; one kind of objects are conceived as a sub-category of a broader range of objects. This is one important aim of physics.]
Published: Jan 14, 2021
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