Empiricism and Philosophy of PhysicsInduction and Concept Formation
Empiricism and Philosophy of Physics: Induction and Concept Formation
Johansson, Lars-Göran
2021-01-14 00:00:00
[The topic of this chapter is the induction problem. The views of Hume, Goodman, Quine and Wittgenstein are discussed, and their common stance, that inductive thinking is a natural habit among us humans, is stressed. Such natural habits make up the basis for concept formation, a point made by e.g. Wittgenstein in On Certainty. The demand for ultimate justification of induction should be rejected as a rationalistic mistake.]
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Empiricism and Philosophy of PhysicsInduction and Concept Formation
[The topic of this chapter is the induction problem. The views of Hume, Goodman, Quine and Wittgenstein are discussed, and their common stance, that inductive thinking is a natural habit among us humans, is stressed. Such natural habits make up the basis for concept formation, a point made by e.g. Wittgenstein in On Certainty. The demand for ultimate justification of induction should be rejected as a rationalistic mistake.]
Published: Jan 14, 2021
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