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Endogenous Timing of R&D Decisions and Privatization Policy with Research Spillovers

Endogenous Timing of R&D Decisions and Privatization Policy with Research Spillovers This study investigates an endogenous R&D timing game between duopoly firms which undertake cost-reducing R&D investments simultaneously or sequentially, and then play Cournot output competition. We examine and compare equilibrium outcomes in private and mixed markets, respectively, and find that spillovers rate critically affects contrasting results. We show that a simultaneous-move (sequential-move) appears in a private duopoly if the spillovers rate is low (high) while a sequential-move appears in a mixed duopoly irrespective of spillovers. We also show that public leadership is the only equilibrium if the spillovers rate is intermediate and its resulting welfare is the highest. This suggests that the implementation of privatization policy transforms a public leader to a private competitor, which can decrease the social welfare. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png "Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade" Springer Journals

Endogenous Timing of R&D Decisions and Privatization Policy with Research Spillovers

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References (92)

Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2021
ISSN
1566-1679
eISSN
1573-7012
DOI
10.1007/s10842-021-00365-5
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

This study investigates an endogenous R&D timing game between duopoly firms which undertake cost-reducing R&D investments simultaneously or sequentially, and then play Cournot output competition. We examine and compare equilibrium outcomes in private and mixed markets, respectively, and find that spillovers rate critically affects contrasting results. We show that a simultaneous-move (sequential-move) appears in a private duopoly if the spillovers rate is low (high) while a sequential-move appears in a mixed duopoly irrespective of spillovers. We also show that public leadership is the only equilibrium if the spillovers rate is intermediate and its resulting welfare is the highest. This suggests that the implementation of privatization policy transforms a public leader to a private competitor, which can decrease the social welfare.

Journal

"Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade"Springer Journals

Published: Dec 1, 2021

Keywords: Private duopoly; Mixed duopoly; R&D spillovers; Endogenous R&D timing game; L13; L32; H21

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