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Fallacies and Their Place in the Foundations of Science

Fallacies and Their Place in the Foundations of Science It has been said that there is no scholarly consensus as to why Aristotle’s logics of proof and refutation would have borne the title Analytics. But if we consulted Tarski’s (Introduction to logic and the methodology of deductive sciences, Oxford University Press, New York, 1941) graduate-level primer, we would have the perfect title for them: Introduction to logic and to the methodology of deductive sciences. There are two strings to Aristotle’s bow. The methodological string is the founding work on the epistemology of science, and the logical string sets down conditions on the proofs that bring this knowledge about. The logic of proof presents a difficulty whose solution exceeds its theoretical reach. The logic of refutation takes the problem on board, and advances a solution whose execution is framed by fallacy-avoidance at the beginning and fallacy-adoption at the end. But with a difference: the avoidance-fallacies are of Aristotle’s own conception, whereas the adoption-fallacies, so judged in the modern tradition, aren’t fallacies at all for Aristotle. The avoidance-fallacies are begging the question and ignoratio elenchi, and the adoption-fallacies, fallacies in name only, are the ad hominem and ad ignorantiam, an inductive turning in the first instance, and an abductive finish in the second. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Argumentation Springer Journals

Fallacies and Their Place in the Foundations of Science

Woods, John
Argumentation , Volume 37 (2) – Jun 1, 2023
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Springer Journals
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Copyright © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. 2023. Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.
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0920-427X
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1572-8374
DOI
10.1007/s10503-023-09609-6
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Abstract

It has been said that there is no scholarly consensus as to why Aristotle’s logics of proof and refutation would have borne the title Analytics. But if we consulted Tarski’s (Introduction to logic and the methodology of deductive sciences, Oxford University Press, New York, 1941) graduate-level primer, we would have the perfect title for them: Introduction to logic and to the methodology of deductive sciences. There are two strings to Aristotle’s bow. The methodological string is the founding work on the epistemology of science, and the logical string sets down conditions on the proofs that bring this knowledge about. The logic of proof presents a difficulty whose solution exceeds its theoretical reach. The logic of refutation takes the problem on board, and advances a solution whose execution is framed by fallacy-avoidance at the beginning and fallacy-adoption at the end. But with a difference: the avoidance-fallacies are of Aristotle’s own conception, whereas the adoption-fallacies, so judged in the modern tradition, aren’t fallacies at all for Aristotle. The avoidance-fallacies are begging the question and ignoratio elenchi, and the adoption-fallacies, fallacies in name only, are the ad hominem and ad ignorantiam, an inductive turning in the first instance, and an abductive finish in the second.

Journal

Argumentation – Springer Journals

Published: Jun 1, 2023

Keywords: Abduction; Ad hominem; Ad ignorantiam; Autoepistemic; Axiom; Begging the question; Deduction; Demonstration; Dialectic; Entailment; Fallacies; Foundations of science; Ignoratio elenchi; Induction; Inference; Proof; Syllogism; Validity

References

  • Axioms in Frege
    Blanchette, Patricia A; Ebert, Philip A; Rossberg, Marcus
  • Completeness of an ancient logic
    Corcoran, John
  • Aristotle’s prior analytics and Boole’s
    Corcoran, John
  • Aristotle’s demonstrative logic
    Corcoran, John
  • Induction: a discussion of the relevance of knowledge to the theory of induction
    Harman, Gilbert; Swain, Marshall
  • On abducing the axioms of mathematics
    Park, Woosuk; Shook, John R; Paavola, Sami
  • What is a syllogism?
    Smiley, Timothy J
  • “What did Frege take Russell to have proved?
    Woods, John
  • The subtleties of Aristotle on non-cause
    Woods, John; Hansen Hans, V
  • How abduction fares in mathematical space
    Woods, John; Magnani, Lorenzo
  • The petitio: Aristotle’s five ways
    Woods, John; Walton, Douglas