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Formal Ontology and Conceptual RealismOn Geach Against General Reference

Formal Ontology and Conceptual Realism: On Geach Against General Reference Chapter 9 On Geach Against General Reference Theories of reference in the 20th Century have been almost exclusively theories of singular reference, i.e., theories of the use of proper names and definite de- scriptions to refer to single objects. General reference by means of quantifier phrases has usually been rejected, mainly because of a confusion of pragmatics with semantics, i.e., a confusion of the referential use of quantifier phrases in speech and mental acts with the truth conditions of sentences containing those phrases. This confusion of pragmatics with semantics is in marked contrast with our conceptualist theory of reference (as described in chapter seven) where singular and general reference are given a unified account. It is also in contrast with medieval suppositio theories where a unified account was also given, but only in terms of categorical propositions. Bertrand Russell had a theory of general reference in his 1903 Principles of Mathematics, but he later abandoned that theory in his 1905 paper, “On Denoting”. In his later 1905 theory, Russell took ordinary proper names to be eliminable in terms of definite descriptions, which were in turn eliminable contextually in terms of quantifier phrases, and quantifier phrases were then said to http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

Formal Ontology and Conceptual RealismOn Geach Against General Reference

Part of the Synthese Library Book Series (volume 339)
Cocchiarella, Nino B.
Formal Ontology and Conceptual Realism — Jan 1, 2007
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Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Copyright
© springer 2007
ISBN
978-1-4020-6203-2
Pages
195 –214
DOI
10.1007/978-1-4020-6204-9_9
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

Chapter 9 On Geach Against General Reference Theories of reference in the 20th Century have been almost exclusively theories of singular reference, i.e., theories of the use of proper names and definite de- scriptions to refer to single objects. General reference by means of quantifier phrases has usually been rejected, mainly because of a confusion of pragmatics with semantics, i.e., a confusion of the referential use of quantifier phrases in speech and mental acts with the truth conditions of sentences containing those phrases. This confusion of pragmatics with semantics is in marked contrast with our conceptualist theory of reference (as described in chapter seven) where singular and general reference are given a unified account. It is also in contrast with medieval suppositio theories where a unified account was also given, but only in terms of categorical propositions. Bertrand Russell had a theory of general reference in his 1903 Principles of Mathematics, but he later abandoned that theory in his 1905 paper, “On Denoting”. In his later 1905 theory, Russell took ordinary proper names to be eliminable in terms of definite descriptions, which were in turn eliminable contextually in terms of quantifier phrases, and quantifier phrases were then said to

Published: Jan 1, 2007

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