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Formal Ontology and Conceptual RealismThe Nexus of Predication

Formal Ontology and Conceptual Realism: The Nexus of Predication Chapter 7 A universal, we have said, is what can be predicated of things. Butwhatexactly do we mean in saying that a universal can be predicated of things? In particular, how, or in what way, do universals function in the nexus of predication? In nominalism, there are no universals, and the only nexus of predication is the linguistic nexus between subject and predicate expressions (or tokens of such). What this means in nominalism is that only predicates can be true or false of things. But what are the semantic grounds for predicates to be true or false of things? Are there really no concepts as cognitive capacities involved in such grounds? What then accounts for the unity of a sentence in nominalism as opposed to a mere sequence of words? Can nominalism really explain the unity of the linguistic nexus? In logical realism, which is a modern form of Platonism, universals exist independently of language, thought, and the natural world, and even of whether or not there is a natural world. Bertrand Russell and Gottlob Frege, as we have noted, described two of the better known versions of logical realism. In Russell’s early form of logical realism, for example, http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

Formal Ontology and Conceptual RealismThe Nexus of Predication

Part of the Synthese Library Book Series (volume 339)
Cocchiarella, Nino B.
Formal Ontology and Conceptual Realism — Jan 1, 2007
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Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Copyright
© springer 2007
ISBN
978-1-4020-6203-2
Pages
139 –167
DOI
10.1007/978-1-4020-6204-9_7
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

Chapter 7 A universal, we have said, is what can be predicated of things. Butwhatexactly do we mean in saying that a universal can be predicated of things? In particular, how, or in what way, do universals function in the nexus of predication? In nominalism, there are no universals, and the only nexus of predication is the linguistic nexus between subject and predicate expressions (or tokens of such). What this means in nominalism is that only predicates can be true or false of things. But what are the semantic grounds for predicates to be true or false of things? Are there really no concepts as cognitive capacities involved in such grounds? What then accounts for the unity of a sentence in nominalism as opposed to a mere sequence of words? Can nominalism really explain the unity of the linguistic nexus? In logical realism, which is a modern form of Platonism, universals exist independently of language, thought, and the natural world, and even of whether or not there is a natural world. Bertrand Russell and Gottlob Frege, as we have noted, described two of the better known versions of logical realism. In Russell’s early form of logical realism, for example,

Published: Jan 1, 2007

Keywords: Intensional Object; Conceptual Realism; Complex Predicate; Predicate Expression; Logical Realism

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