Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

Founding Mathematics on Semantic ConventionsConventional Truth

Founding Mathematics on Semantic Conventions: Conventional Truth [This chapter contains a solution to the liar paradox. Unlike most other proposed solutions, it does not consist in a claim about how truth values are distributed over some language that allows for self-reference. Instead, it takes one step back: to what truth conditions are in general, namely, a conventional system instituted by thinking subjects for the purpose of communicating with one another; to why our collective intentions for that system cannot be fully satisfied; and to how we tend to be naïve about that limitation, resulting in discrepancies between the actual truth conditions of some sentences and the truth conditions we think they have. This solution is inspired by David Lewis’s theory of conventions and Thomas Nagel’s concept of a view from nowhere. One important consequence of that solution is that we are, in a sense, free to choose our logic. We can, for instance, choose between classical logic, a gappy logic like the one that results from Saul Kripke’s work on the paradoxes, or a glutty, dialetheist logic.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

Founding Mathematics on Semantic ConventionsConventional Truth

Part of the Synthese Library Book Series (volume 446)
Hansen, Casper Storm
Founding Mathematics on Semantic Conventions — Nov 5, 2021
Download PDF
21 pages

Loading next page...
 
/lp/springer-journals/founding-mathematics-on-semantic-conventions-conventional-truth-Di0wSVrPRh
Publisher
Springer International Publishing
Copyright
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021
ISBN
978-3-030-88533-5
Pages
67 –88
DOI
10.1007/978-3-030-88534-2_5
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[This chapter contains a solution to the liar paradox. Unlike most other proposed solutions, it does not consist in a claim about how truth values are distributed over some language that allows for self-reference. Instead, it takes one step back: to what truth conditions are in general, namely, a conventional system instituted by thinking subjects for the purpose of communicating with one another; to why our collective intentions for that system cannot be fully satisfied; and to how we tend to be naïve about that limitation, resulting in discrepancies between the actual truth conditions of some sentences and the truth conditions we think they have. This solution is inspired by David Lewis’s theory of conventions and Thomas Nagel’s concept of a view from nowhere. One important consequence of that solution is that we are, in a sense, free to choose our logic. We can, for instance, choose between classical logic, a gappy logic like the one that results from Saul Kripke’s work on the paradoxes, or a glutty, dialetheist logic.]

Published: Nov 5, 2021

There are no references for this article.