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Four Characterizations of Constrained Pareto Efficiency in Continuum Economies with Widespread Externalities

Four Characterizations of Constrained Pareto Efficiency in Continuum Economies with Widespread... Abstract In continuum economies, widespread externalities are those over which each individual has negligible control. Nash-Walrasian equilibria with lump-sum transfers are defined, and their existence proved. They are then characterized by the property of “f-constrained Pareto efficiency” for finite coalitions. More general “private good” Nash-Walrasian equilibria are characterized as private-good constrained-Pareto efficient. Introducing complete Pigou taxes or subsidies leads to equilibria that are characterized by constrained efficiency and f-constrained efficiency for given levels of the widespread externalities. But full efficiency requires resolving the public-good problem of determining those aggregate externalities or, equivalently, of setting appropriate Pigou prices. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Japanese Economic Review Springer Journals

Four Characterizations of Constrained Pareto Efficiency in Continuum Economies with Widespread Externalities

The Japanese Economic Review , Volume 46 (2): 22 – Jun 1, 1995

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References (62)

Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
1995 Japanese Economic Association
ISSN
1352-4739
eISSN
1468-5876
DOI
10.1111/j.1468-5876.1995.tb00007.x
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Abstract In continuum economies, widespread externalities are those over which each individual has negligible control. Nash-Walrasian equilibria with lump-sum transfers are defined, and their existence proved. They are then characterized by the property of “f-constrained Pareto efficiency” for finite coalitions. More general “private good” Nash-Walrasian equilibria are characterized as private-good constrained-Pareto efficient. Introducing complete Pigou taxes or subsidies leads to equilibria that are characterized by constrained efficiency and f-constrained efficiency for given levels of the widespread externalities. But full efficiency requires resolving the public-good problem of determining those aggregate externalities or, equivalently, of setting appropriate Pigou prices.

Journal

The Japanese Economic ReviewSpringer Journals

Published: Jun 1, 1995

Keywords: economics, general; microeconomics; macroeconomics/monetary economics//financial economics; econometrics; development economics; economic history

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