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Chapter 3 DESCRIPTIVE PSYCHOLOGY: THE THEORY OF JUDGEMENT AS THE THEORY OF COGNITION AND KNOWLEDGE 1. Franz Brentano (I): The Act of Judging as the Truth Bearer Franz Brentano was conscious of the problem of the truthbearer inthat hewas ableto describe it inthe way citedinthe previous chapter. He also gave gen- eral reasons for choosing acts ofjudging as the entities serving as truthbearers. Inwhat follows I shall present some of these reasons. Since Brentano’s argu- ments can be seen as a part of thescience ofdescriptive psychology that he founded,as well as a part of what we would nowadayscall linguistic investiga- tions, I shall divide hisargumentation into two parts. In the first section of this chapter I shall present the descriptive-psychological part of Brentano’s argu- mentation. I shall briefly describe their linguistic counterparts at the beginning of the next chapter. It is quite difficult to make unambiguous statements about Brentano’s philo- sophical views. This is because he belongstothe group of philosophers who have changed their views more than once in the course of their philosophi- cal activity. Moreover, since most of Brentano’s writings are given in statu nascendi, it is difficult to give an ultimate interpretation. I shall try to
Published: Jan 1, 2005
Keywords: True Judgment; Truth Bearer; Accor Ding; Evident Judgment
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