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Chapter 4 1. Franz Brentano (II): Linguistic Analysis Very often in hiswritings the argumentation given by Brentano in his descrip- tive-psychologicalinvestigations concerning the truth ofjudgments has its co- unterparts in linguistic analysis. The growing interest inthe linguistic justifi- cation of thethesisofdescriptive psychology inthe late phase of Brentano’s philosophy is usually seen as an outcome of thealready mentioned1908 work ofhis pupil Anton Marty Untersuchungen . .. However, it isquite difficult to state how far Marty alone is responsible for Brentano’s growinginterests in language and how important such an analysis was for him before Marty’s texts about language appeared. Brentano’s early linguistic analyses are in- cluded, among other places, in his lectures on logic, inthe paper ‘On the 2 3 concept of truth’, andinthetext‘Miklosich on Subjectless Propositions.’ All of them were worked out inthe 1880’s, i.e. after Marty publishedhis Über die Ursprungder Sprache [On theOriginof Language]. The fact isthat the linguistic part of Brentano’s philosophy became even more important during his later activity. A linguistic analysis presents above all an important part of Brentano’s later period of reism. However, since in Brentano’s account reism is fundamentally a metaphysical view on mind,Ishall present Brentano’s reistic arguments about truth and its bearer in
Published: Jan 1, 2005
Keywords: Proper Sense; False Friend; Accor Ding; Indirect Judgment
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