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Chapter 2 1. The Place of the Notion of the Truth Bearer in the Theory of Truth Critics of the analytic position inphilosophy state that when one does not know how to beginan issue, one begins with an analysisof the usage of a term in ordinary language. I am not, however, in a position to begin such an analysis, for the term I am interestedin, the ‘truthbearer’, does not belong to ordinary language. It is one of those terms that are introducedfor a special purpose ina given theory:the ‘truthbearer’ is a term introducedfor the purposes of ageneral philosophical theory of truth.Thus, inorder to verify whether the term is useful for such a theory, one should take a look at the general framework of such a theory. Recent philosophers commonly include under the notion of a ‘theory of truth’ such general topics as the definition of truth, the criteria for truth, and the question of the bearers of truth. Each of these topics receives separate treatment in Bertrand Russell’s writings on truth. Thus, one can claimthat the tradition inwhich thetheory of truth consists of those parts isasold as analyticphilosophy itself.When we examine the literature on truthinthe his- tory of philosophy
Published: Jan 1, 2005
Keywords: True Judgment; Truth Bearer; Pluralistic Attitude; Accor Ding; Nihilistic View
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