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How do people choose their commuting mode? An evolutionary approach to travel choices

How do people choose their commuting mode? An evolutionary approach to travel choices Abstract A considerable amount of studies in the transport literature is aimed at understanding the behavioural processes underlying travel choices, like mode and destination choices. In the present work, we propose the use of evolutionary game theory as a framework to study commuter mode choice. Evolutionary game models work under the assumptions that agents are boundedly rational and imitate others’ behaviour. We examine the possible dynamics that can emerge in a homogeneous urban population where commuters can choose between two modes, private car or public transport. We obtain a different number of equilibria depending on the values of the parameters of the model. We carry out comparative-static exercises and examine possible policy measures that can be implemented in order to modify the agents’ payoff, and consequently the equilibria of the system, leading society towards more sustainable transportation patterns. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png "Economia Politica" Springer Journals

How do people choose their commuting mode? An evolutionary approach to travel choices

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References (55)

Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
2018 Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature
ISSN
1120-2890
eISSN
1973-820X
DOI
10.1007/s40888-018-0099-1
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Abstract A considerable amount of studies in the transport literature is aimed at understanding the behavioural processes underlying travel choices, like mode and destination choices. In the present work, we propose the use of evolutionary game theory as a framework to study commuter mode choice. Evolutionary game models work under the assumptions that agents are boundedly rational and imitate others’ behaviour. We examine the possible dynamics that can emerge in a homogeneous urban population where commuters can choose between two modes, private car or public transport. We obtain a different number of equilibria depending on the values of the parameters of the model. We carry out comparative-static exercises and examine possible policy measures that can be implemented in order to modify the agents’ payoff, and consequently the equilibria of the system, leading society towards more sustainable transportation patterns.

Journal

"Economia Politica"Springer Journals

Published: Oct 1, 2019

Keywords: Economic Policy; International Political Economy

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