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- Publisher
- Springer Journals
- Copyright
- Copyright © 2014 by Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
- Subject
- Economics / Management Science; Regional/Spatial Science; Agricultural Economics; Geographical Information Systems/Cartography; Landscape/Regional and Urban Planning; Environmental Economics; Demography
- ISSN
- 1864-4031
- eISSN
- 1864-404X
- DOI
- 10.1007/s12076-014-0123-1
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
This paper concerns income- and production taxation in a decentralized fiscal federalism model where the ability to commit differs among member countries. It is assumed that the federal government dictates environmental targets to be implemented at the national level, where the horizontal leader has commitment power vis-à-vis the other country (the follower). The results show how incentives underlying the horizontal leader’s tax policies are influenced by the decision structure.
Journal
Letters in Spatial and Resource Science – Springer Journals
Published: Jul 17, 2014