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Law as InstitutionLaw as Institution

Law as Institution: Law as Institution [In Chapter 4 there is the attempt to build a bridge between such theory and the traditional institutionalist theories of law. These are reviewed and then supplemented through the neo-institutionalism more recently defended by Neil MacCormick and Ota Weinberger. Neo-institutionalism is then said to be the most promising approach to cope with the ontology of law, though some reform in the standard theory is proposed to render more plausible and less circular the definition given of what an “institution” means and is. In particular, constitutive rules or “declarations” cannot kept outside an institutionalist perspective, though they cannot be said to produce directly “institutional facts” or better the scope of action which the “institution” consists of. They are rather “conditions” to be prescribed in understanding and performing a piece of conduct. This is why a definition of “institution” is advanced whereby constitutive rules are integrated with a notion of efficacy and effective performance.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

Law as InstitutionLaw as Institution

Part of the Law and Philosophy Library Book Series (volume 90)
Law as Institution — Aug 10, 2010

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Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Copyright
© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010
ISBN
978-1-4020-6606-1
Pages
97 –134
DOI
10.1007/978-1-4020-6607-8_4
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[In Chapter 4 there is the attempt to build a bridge between such theory and the traditional institutionalist theories of law. These are reviewed and then supplemented through the neo-institutionalism more recently defended by Neil MacCormick and Ota Weinberger. Neo-institutionalism is then said to be the most promising approach to cope with the ontology of law, though some reform in the standard theory is proposed to render more plausible and less circular the definition given of what an “institution” means and is. In particular, constitutive rules or “declarations” cannot kept outside an institutionalist perspective, though they cannot be said to produce directly “institutional facts” or better the scope of action which the “institution” consists of. They are rather “conditions” to be prescribed in understanding and performing a piece of conduct. This is why a definition of “institution” is advanced whereby constitutive rules are integrated with a notion of efficacy and effective performance.]

Published: Aug 10, 2010

Keywords: Institutional Fact; Legal Order; Legal Norm; Constitutive Rule; Practical Information

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