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Legal Personhood: Animals, Artificial Intelligence and the UnbornThe Troublesome ‘Person’

Legal Personhood: Animals, Artificial Intelligence and the Unborn: The Troublesome ‘Person’ [In this paper I argue that the concept of person as utilized in legal and ethical discourse has no stable meaning, which often leads to premature conclusions and confusion. I identify three different ways of philosophical understanding of ‘person’ – the classical, the psychological and the ethical. I further observe that in the law the term is used as a technical device, which has little to do with the philosophical conceptions of the person. Finally, I claim that ‘person’ is also a part of the conceptual repertoire of folk psychology, and hence cannot be simply dispensed with. Rather, its use in legal and ethical debates should be accompanied by methodological awareness and caution.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

Legal Personhood: Animals, Artificial Intelligence and the UnbornThe Troublesome ‘Person’

Part of the Law and Philosophy Library Book Series (volume 119)
Editors: Kurki, Visa A.J.; Pietrzykowski, Tomasz
Brożek, Bartosz
Legal Personhood: Animals, Artificial Intelligence and the Unborn — Mar 24, 2017
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Publisher
Springer International Publishing
Copyright
© Springer International Publishing AG 2017
ISBN
978-3-319-53461-9
Pages
3 –13
DOI
10.1007/978-3-319-53462-6_1
Publisher site
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Abstract

[In this paper I argue that the concept of person as utilized in legal and ethical discourse has no stable meaning, which often leads to premature conclusions and confusion. I identify three different ways of philosophical understanding of ‘person’ – the classical, the psychological and the ethical. I further observe that in the law the term is used as a technical device, which has little to do with the philosophical conceptions of the person. Finally, I claim that ‘person’ is also a part of the conceptual repertoire of folk psychology, and hence cannot be simply dispensed with. Rather, its use in legal and ethical debates should be accompanied by methodological awareness and caution.]

Published: Mar 24, 2017

Keywords: Person; Law; Ethics; Folk psychology; Boethius; Locke; Kant

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