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Legal Statements and Normative Language

Legal Statements and Normative Language Can there be a non-reductivist, source-based explanation of the use of normative language in statements describing the law and legal situations? This problem was formulated by Joseph Raz, who also claimed to have solved it. According to his well-known doctrine of ‘detached’ statements, normative legal statements can be informatively made by speakers who merely adopt, without necessarily sharing, the point of view of someone who accepts that legal norms are justified and ought to be followed. In this paper I defend two theses. I argue, first, that the notion of a detached statement cannot be made to work, and that Raz’s problem is thus not thereby solved. But the problem itself, I also suggest, is a false one. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Law and Philosophy Springer Journals

Legal Statements and Normative Language

Law and Philosophy , Volume 30 (2) – Dec 12, 2010

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Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2010 by Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
Subject
Law; Theories of Law, Philosophy of Law, Legal History; Philosophy of Law; Ethics; Political Philosophy
ISSN
0167-5249
eISSN
1573-0522
DOI
10.1007/s10982-010-9089-3
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Can there be a non-reductivist, source-based explanation of the use of normative language in statements describing the law and legal situations? This problem was formulated by Joseph Raz, who also claimed to have solved it. According to his well-known doctrine of ‘detached’ statements, normative legal statements can be informatively made by speakers who merely adopt, without necessarily sharing, the point of view of someone who accepts that legal norms are justified and ought to be followed. In this paper I defend two theses. I argue, first, that the notion of a detached statement cannot be made to work, and that Raz’s problem is thus not thereby solved. But the problem itself, I also suggest, is a false one.

Journal

Law and PhilosophySpringer Journals

Published: Dec 12, 2010

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