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Medicine and Society, New Perspectives in Continental PhilosophyBeing Machine: Two Competing Models for Neuroprosthesis

Medicine and Society, New Perspectives in Continental Philosophy: Being Machine: Two Competing... [Andy Clark’s and David Chalmers’s “extended mind hypothesis” provides a theoretical account for our bodily and cognitive extension into external technologies like medical prosthetics. Clark as well as therapeutic prosthetic researchers draw from Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of the body to explain how such devices become a part of our body schemas. Yet, Merleau-Ponty’s organic model of bodily embeddedness in the world  seems to be at odds with the notion of the human body becoming more like machines made of very dissimilar parts. I will argue instead that Deleuze’s and Guattari’s “machinic” model is a more promising theoretical basis for the notion of posthuman enhancement and also for successful therapeutic prosthesis usage.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

Medicine and Society, New Perspectives in Continental PhilosophyBeing Machine: Two Competing Models for Neuroprosthesis

Part of the Philosophy and Medicine Book Series (volume 120)
Editors: Meacham, Darian
Shores, Corry
Medicine and Society, New Perspectives in Continental Philosophy — May 23, 2015
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References (35)

Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Copyright
© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
ISBN
978-94-017-9869-3
Pages
271 –294
DOI
10.1007/978-94-017-9870-9_16
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[Andy Clark’s and David Chalmers’s “extended mind hypothesis” provides a theoretical account for our bodily and cognitive extension into external technologies like medical prosthetics. Clark as well as therapeutic prosthetic researchers draw from Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of the body to explain how such devices become a part of our body schemas. Yet, Merleau-Ponty’s organic model of bodily embeddedness in the world  seems to be at odds with the notion of the human body becoming more like machines made of very dissimilar parts. I will argue instead that Deleuze’s and Guattari’s “machinic” model is a more promising theoretical basis for the notion of posthuman enhancement and also for successful therapeutic prosthesis usage.]

Published: May 23, 2015

Keywords: Cognitive System; Cochlear Implant; Body Schema; Prosthetic Device; Emphasis Mine

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