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Modal Justification via TheoriesAgainst Optimism

Modal Justification via Theories: Against Optimism [Many metaphysicians will be inclined to see TEM as too cautious, and count that as a cost. However, I doubt that TEM’s rivals can underwrite more modal justification than TEM offers. To make this case, I examine three representative modal epistemologies—Stephen Yablo’s defense of conceivability as a guide to possibility, David Chalmer’s modal rationalism, and Timothy Williamson’s counterfactual theory.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

Modal Justification via TheoriesAgainst Optimism

Part of the Synthese Library Book Series (volume 380)

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Publisher
Springer International Publishing
Copyright
© Springer International Publishing AG 2017
ISBN
978-3-319-49126-4
Pages
107 –126
DOI
10.1007/978-3-319-49127-1_6
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[Many metaphysicians will be inclined to see TEM as too cautious, and count that as a cost. However, I doubt that TEM’s rivals can underwrite more modal justification than TEM offers. To make this case, I examine three representative modal epistemologies—Stephen Yablo’s defense of conceivability as a guide to possibility, David Chalmer’s modal rationalism, and Timothy Williamson’s counterfactual theory.]

Published: Dec 16, 2016

Keywords: Modal Knowledge; Modal Claim; Primary Intension; Phenomenal Conservatism; Counterfactual Supposition

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