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Modal Justification via TheoriesTEM and Modal Skepticism

Modal Justification via Theories: TEM and Modal Skepticism [In this chapter, I argue that TEM is offers a better basis for modal skepticism than the one van Inwagen develops. My aim here is twofold. On the one hand, I want to show that TEM can lead to a form of modal skepticism, and if it does, then it leads to a better form than what’s previously been available. Second, I want to clarify what it would take to get a non-skeptical version of TEM—i.e., one on which we’re justified in believing some extraordinary modal claims. In other words, the goal here is to give a better sense of what TEM requires of those who think, for example, that they justifiably believe that there could be a maximally perfect being. Doing so will help us appreciate the nature of TEM’s cautiousness, as well as what’s valuable about it.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

Modal Justification via TheoriesTEM and Modal Skepticism

Part of the Synthese Library Book Series (volume 380)
Fischer, Bob
Modal Justification via Theories — Dec 16, 2016
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Publisher
Springer International Publishing
Copyright
© Springer International Publishing AG 2017
ISBN
978-3-319-49126-4
Pages
81 –105
DOI
10.1007/978-3-319-49127-1_5
Publisher site
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Abstract

[In this chapter, I argue that TEM is offers a better basis for modal skepticism than the one van Inwagen develops. My aim here is twofold. On the one hand, I want to show that TEM can lead to a form of modal skepticism, and if it does, then it leads to a better form than what’s previously been available. Second, I want to clarify what it would take to get a non-skeptical version of TEM—i.e., one on which we’re justified in believing some extraordinary modal claims. In other words, the goal here is to give a better sense of what TEM requires of those who think, for example, that they justifiably believe that there could be a maximally perfect being. Doing so will help us appreciate the nature of TEM’s cautiousness, as well as what’s valuable about it.]

Published: Dec 16, 2016

Keywords: Perceptual Knowledge; Contingent Truth; Metaphysical Theory; Metaphysical Possibility; Modal Knowledge

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