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[According to TEM, a person is justified in believing an interesting modal claim, p, if and only if (a) she is justified in believing a theory according to which p is true, (b) she believes p on the basis of that theory, and (c) she has no defeaters for her belief that p. Accordingly, we need a story about how we come to justifiably believe theories, a story about theories on which they have modal content, and a story about what it is to believe a claim on the basis of a theory. This chapter provides the second and third story, and explains why I can leave the problem of theory confirmation for others.]
Published: Dec 16, 2016
Keywords: Mental Model; Modal Content; Semantic View; Theoretical Hypothesis; Metaphysical Theory
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